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Interdisciplinary studies that draw on long-term, global population projections often
make limited use of projection results, due at least in part to the historically opaque
nature of the projection process. We present a guide to such projections aimed at
researchers and educators who would benefit from putting them to greater use. Drawing
on new practices and new thinking on uncertainty, methodology, and the likely future
courses of fertility and life expectancy, we discuss who makes projections and how, and
the key assumptions upon which they are based. We also compare methodology and
recent results from prominent institutions and provide a guide to other sources of
demographic information, pointers to projection results, and an entry point to key
literature in the field.
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1. Introduction
Demographic factors are important components of both the causes of and responses to
future economic, environmental, and social change. Interdisciplinary studies of future
global change can draw on projected trends in population size and growth rate, age
structure, urbanization, and migration, among other variables. Often, however,
integration does not proceed far beyond uncritical acceptance of a single projection of
future population size. For example, studies of environmental change may use
projections simply to scale per capita trends in other factors. Part of the difficulty in
making fuller use of projections in such work stems from uncertainties in how
demographics, acting in concert with social, economic, and cultural forces, may affect
the environment. However, the historically opaque nature of the projection process has
presented obstacles as well. How projections are made, the basis for key assumptions,
and how projections differ among institutions that produce them has not always been
clear to users, making the interpretation of results difficult.
We present a guide to long-term, global projections aimed at researchers and
educators who might benefit from putting them to greater use. There has been a
resurgence of research and new practices in projecting population that are likely to
make results more useful and methodology more transparent. New thinking is being
employed on how best to express uncertainty, on new methodological approaches to
projections, and on the likely future courses of fertility and life expectancy. In addition,
projections have demonstrated the importance of recent revisions to current estimates of
demographic variables. In sections 2 and 3, we discuss the kinds and uses of
projections, and the primary institutions producing long-term global projections. In
section 4, we discuss projection methodology, reviewing the standard cohort-
component method as well as alternatives, and discuss various approaches to expressing
the uncertainty of projections. In section 5 we discuss the key assumptions upon which
projections are based: baseline demographic data and trends in future fertility, mortality
and migration. This section includes a discussion of the conceptual basis for projections
of each component, possible environmental  feedbacks, and a comparison of
assumptions made by different institutions. Section 6 considers projection outcomes,
discussing and comparing results of projected population size, age structure, and
distribution. It also includes a discussion and analysis of the accuracy of historical
projections.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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2. Projections and their uses
Population projections (Note 1) differ widely in their geographic coverage, time
horizon, types of output, and use. Spatial dimensions can range from local areas (like
counties or cities) to the entire world. Local-area projections tend to use shorter time
horizons, typically less than 10 years, whereas national and global projections can
extend decades into the future, and in some cases more than a century. These longer-
term projections typically produce a more limited number of output variables, primarily
population broken down by age and sex. In contrast, projections for smaller regions
often include other characteristics as well, which might include educational and labor
force composition, urban residence, or household type.
The diversity of types of projections is driven by the diversity of users' needs (Lutz
et al 1996a). Commercial organizations often use projections for marketing research
and generally want a single most likely forecast. They typically want population
classified by socioeconomic categories such as income and consumption habits (in
addition to age and sex) and by place of residence. Government planners may be
concerned with population aging and its potential social and economic impact. They
may therefore desire longer-term projections, and want to know more about the health
status and living arrangements of the elderly.
The policy community, including advocacy groups, often would like alternatives to
a single most likely scenario, including projections that reflect the influence of policy.
For example, those concerned with the environmental impacts of population growth
may be interested in the potential for reductions in such growth through population-
related policies. In addition, they may want to know what the potential effect of
environmental  feedbacks on growth might be, a topic recently highlighted as
underdeveloped by the National Research Council (NRC 2000). Global change
researchers often use projections as exogenous inputs to studies on topics such as
energy consumption, food supply, and global warming. These studies usually require
projections with long time horizons (a century or more) and a range of scenarios rather
than a single most likely projection.
We focus here on a relatively small subset of projections: long-term, global
population projections - that is, sets of projections that may be made at the national or
regional level but that cover the entire world. The time horizon of these projections
typically ranges from 50 to 150 years. Demographers often feel uncomfortable making
projections farther than a few decades into the future; uncertainty grows with the time
horizon, and increases substantially beyond 30-40 years, when most of the population
will be made up of people not yet born. Nonetheless, long-term global projections are
increasingly in demand by global change researchers and educators. Only a fewDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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institutions produce such projections, but research and practice has been evolving
rapidly.
3. Who produces projections?
The earliest systematic global population projection dates to Notestein (1945), although
many national level projection efforts began over half a century earlier (see reviews by
Dorn 1950 and Hajnal 1955). Since the 1950s, the United Nations (UN) has taken a
leadership role in the production of projections and dissemination of their results. Later
efforts, most of which continue to date, have been undertaken by three other
institutions: the United States Census Bureau (USCB), the World Bank (WB), and the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). Global long-run
population projections tend not to be undertaken by individual researchers. Individual
researchers have tended to create projections at the national-level (or below) and at this
level have made significant contributions to varying methodologies (see section 4).
Table 1 reviews the basic features of the most recent projection made by the each
of the four institutions. The time horizons vary from roughly 50 years to 150 years. The
input assumptions upon which the projections are based — i.e., future rates of fertility,
mortality and migration (see General Assumptions, below) — vary considerably, as
does the number of output scenarios produced. Below we briefly summarize the
historical experience of projecting population at each of these institutions.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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1998* 2050 Country 4 1 1 4
United Nations,
Long-term Series
1998 2150 8 regions 7 2 1 12
World Bank 1994-95 2150 Country 3 1 1 3
IIASA 1996






§ 2050 Country 1 1 1 1
Population
Reference Bureau
2000 2050 Country 1 1 1 1
* The UN has recently produced its 2000 Revision, but complete results were not available at the time of this writing.
† IIASA has recently updated its probabilistic projections, but full documentation is not yet available. Preliminary results are discussed
in the main text.
§ In addition to these published projections, the USCB offers more recent projection output (2000) on-line (see:
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsprd.html).
3.1 The United Nations (UN)
Between 1951 and 1998, the United Nations has produced 16 sets of estimates and
projections covering all countries and areas of the world. Prior to 1978, new revisions
were published approximately every 5 years; since then, they have been published
every 2 years. These projections, published in their World Population Prospects series,
include four scenarios which differ in their assumptions about future fertility rates:
high, medium, and low fertility scenarios, as well as an illustrative scenario in which
fertility is held constant at current rates.
The UN also produces long-range projections approximately every 10 years, which
are based on and extend the most recent set of shorter-term projections. However the
most recent long-term projections (UN 1999a) were produced just two years after the
previous set. This unusually short interval was thought necessary due to substantial
changes made in the 1998 Revision of World Population Prospects, which introduced
new data and assumptions relative to the 1996 Revision, particularly new information
on current fertility levels and the abandonment of the assumption that fertility in
countries that are currently below replacement level (Note 2) would rise to replacement
level before 2050. The long-term projections are produced for 8 major areas of the
world and include seven scenarios which differ only in their assumptions about future
fertility trends: high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, and low scenarios, as well
as illustrative constant-fertility and instant replacement-level fertility scenarios. InDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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addition, another five scenarios illustrate the influence of rising life expectancy on
projection outcomes by pairing the first five fertility scenarios with alternative mortality
scenarios in which mortality is assumed to remain constant after 2025 or 2050.
3.2 The World Bank
In 1978, the World Bank began producing population projections associated with their
annual World Development Report (e.g., World Bank 1984). Projections are made at the
country level, and until 1984 results were reported only for 1990, 2000, and the year in
which the population became stationary (Note 3). More recent versions of the World
Development Reports contain population projections out to 2000 and 2025, but not the
year at which stationarity is achieved.
From 1984 through 1994-95 the World Bank produced a total of six roughly
biennial long-term projections, out to 2150 (the first and last of these are Vu 1984; and
Bos et al 1994). Until 1992-93, projections included only one variant. The 1992-93 and
1994-95 projections have a “base-case” and two alternative projections that assume
either slow or rapid fertility decline (McNicoll 1992; World Bank, 1994). In additional
to global population projections, the World Bank also produced numerous long-range
regional projections. Since the 1994-95 projections, the World Bank no longer
publishes their projection results although they continue to make long-term projections
for internal use (e.g., for pension projects) (E. Bos, pers. communication).
Since 1997, the World Bank has included 40-year (45-year, starting in 2000)
projection output as part of their World Development Indicators CD-ROM (cf., WB,
2000). Because the World Bank’s published projections are less than 50 years, we do
not consider their projections in detail.
3.3 The United States Census Bureau (USCB)
The United States Census Bureau began producing global population projections in
1985, publishing them in the (nearly) biannual World Population Profile series (USCB
1985). Projections are made for all countries and areas of the world for a single
scenario, and printed versions of their output show results for 15–25 years into the
future. In the 1998 projections, results through 2025 are given, although output through
2050 is offered in an on-line service, which is generally updated annually (Johnson,
pers. comm.). Additionally, they produce projections for the United States out to 2100
(USCB 2000).Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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3.4 The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
The Population Project at IIASA first produced a set of long-range global population
projections in 1994 (Lutz 1994), and updated those projections in 1996 (Lutz 1996).
Projections are made for 13 regions of the world through 2100, and three scenarios for
fertility, mortality, and migration are considered. The full set of possible combinations
of these assumptions leads to a total of 27 output scenarios, but even this understates
the possible total because for a given migration scenario, different scenarios for fertility
and mortality in each region can be selected and combined by the user without
sacrificing self-consistency (i.e., net migration for the world is always zero). A unique
feature of the IIASA projections is that they also provide probabilistic output: that is,
the likelihood that population will reach a given size and age structure over the course
of the projection period (see section 4). IIASA has recently updated their probabilistic
projections, but details were not yet available at the time of this writing.
3.5 The Population Reference Bureau (PRB)
The PRB annually produces a  World Population Data Sheet, which contains
information such as population counts, fertility and infant mortality rates, doubling
time, proportion urban and short population projections out to 2010 and 2025 for all
countries in the world. Starting with their 2000 version of the Data Sheet, they have
begun projecting population to 2025 and 2050 (PRB 2000). They distribute their output
— total population size only, a single scenario — for all countries and select regions,
via the web and hard copy.
Because PRB just began to include long-term projections, and because they limit
their public output to total population size, we do not consider them in the remainder of
this paper. However, since  PRB’s written materials do not indicate how their
projections differ from others, we will do that briefly here. PRB uses a combination of
country-supplied projections, projections produced by the UN or the US Census Bureau
as well as generating their own in a minority of countries. Typically, they generate their
own projections only when they have access to more recent or more reliable data on
either baseline population, fertility or mortality, than either of the existing sources of
projection output (D. Cornelius, pers. communication). Like the above institutions, they
use the cohort-component methodology.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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4. Projection methodology
4.1 The cohort-component method
While some projections for individual countries or regions have been made with
alternative techniques, all long-term global population projections employ the cohort-
component method (Note 4). Initial populations for countries or regions are grouped
into cohorts defined by age and sex, and the projection proceeds by updating the
population of each age- and sex-specific group according to assumptions about three
components of population change: fertility, mortality, and migration. Each cohort
survives forward to the next age group according to assumed age-specific mortality
rates. Five-year age groups (and five year time steps) are commonly used (although not
strictly necessary) for long-range projections (Note 5). As an example, the number of
females in a particular population aged 20-25 in 2005 is calculated as the number of
females aged 15-20 in 2000 multiplied by the assumed probability of survival for
females of that age over the time period 2000-2005. This calculation is made for each
age group and for both sexes, and repeated for each time step as the projection
proceeds. Migration can be accounted for by applying age- and sex-specific net
migration rates to each cohort as well, and ensuring that immigration equals emigration
when summed over all regions.
The size of the youngest age group is also affected by the number of births, which
is calculated by applying assumed age-specific fertility rates to female cohorts in the
reproductive age span (see Figure 1). An assumed sex ratio at birth is used to divide
total births into males and females.
Development of this approach was the major innovation in the evolution of
projection methodology. It was first proposed by the English economist Edwin Cannan
(1895), and was then re-introduced by Whelpton (1936), formalized in mathematical
terms by Leslie (1945), and first employed in producing a global population projection
by  Notestein (1945). Prior to the mid-20
th century, the few global population
projections that had been made were based on extrapolations of the population growth
rate applied to estimates of the total population of the world (Frejka 1981, 1994).
Since Notestein's 1945 projection, the cohort-component method has become the
dominant means of projecting population and has remained essentially unchanged,
except for extensions to multi-state projections and innovations in characterizing
uncertainty as described below. A fundamental feature of the method is that the
projected size and age structure of the population at any point in the future dependsDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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Figure 1: An illustration of one time step of the cohort component method for a
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entirely on the size and age structure at the beginning of the period and the age-specific
fertility, mortality, and migration rates over the projection period. Uncertainty in
projection outcomes arises not from uncertainty in the formal projection model itself,
but from uncertainty in the baseline population data and the assumptions of future
trends in vital rates.
The fact that projecting fertility, mortality and migration plays a central role in the
cohort-component methodology is considered a strength because it allows
demographers to draw on specialized knowledge of each of these components of
population change. Institutions therefore normally project trends in vital rates based on
expert opinion. Historically, however, it has been difficult to determine precisely how
knowledge has been applied to such projections. Assumptions and reasoning have been
hidden behind a "veil of secrecy" (Ahlburg and Lutz 1998). For example, while both the
UN and the USCB provide general descriptions of their methodology (UN 1999a,
1999d, USCB 1998), neither institution provides a detailed accounting of the reasoning
underlying the specific assumptions made for different countries and regions of the
world. In general terms, the UN arrives at scenarios for future trends in vital rates
through the use of in-house expertise, supplemented by consultation with groups of
experts that are occasionally convened to discuss specific topics.
IIASA's projections have been somewhat more transparent in that they are based
explicitly on the results of discussions of a group of experts on fertility, mortality, and
migration that is convened for the purpose of producing scenarios for these vital rates.
In addition, IIASA publishes sets of background papers written by expert group
members that inform its projections and also documents its method of drawing on
expert opinion (Lutz 1994, 1995, 1996). However, even in this case it is impossible to
capture all of the factors considered in the decision-making process. For example, while
the original goal for the IIASA expert group was to come to consensus on projected
high and low values for vital rates that would cover 80-90% of possible future values in
major world regions for a target year of 2030, group discussion was inconclusive (Lutz
1995). Therefore, three IIASA authors chose the high and low values for each region
and vital rate after the meeting, based on their own knowledge and informed by the
discussion at the meeting. Their choices were then sent to the participants for comment,
which produced only minor subsequent modifications. The exercise convinced the
authors that ultimate responsibility for defining assumptions could not practically be
shared across a broad group of experts, although expert input was essential to the task.
Research continues on effective means of employing expert opinion in projections
(Ahlburg 2000), and IIASA plans to further develop this methodology for future




Some national population projections have been made based on analyses of time series
of either aggregate population size, or of vital rates. Aggregate time series models do
away with the cohort component method entirely. For example, Pearl and Reed (1920),
working before the cohort component method had been formalized and widely adopted,
sought to apply a simple law of population growth such as the logistic (S-shaped) curve
to extrapolate past changes in population size. Leach (1981) re-examined the approach
using data from several countries and found it useful in describing historical changes in
population size and for short-term projections.  Marchetti et al. (1996) found that
historical trends in total fertility and life expectancy, as well as population size, are
well-approximated by logistic curves. However, in both of these more recent studies it
was concluded that the logistic model provides little basis for extending trends into the
long-term future. The fundamental difficulty is that a single logistic curve assumes a
fixed limit to the variable being modeled, and in human populations those limits can be
altered through changes in technology (e.g. changes in agricultural productivity, or
health care) or social factors (e.g. changes in family size norms). Thus while a
particular curve may fit historical observations, it does not provide any guidance on
how the assumed limit may be altered in the future. Furthermore, a logistic function
does not allow the direction of change to be reversed. For example, it does not allow for
a decreasing population size, or a reversal in the direction of modeled fertility change.
Nonetheless, arguments have been advanced that simple extrapolation and more
sophisticated aggregate time series methods still have much to offer projection
methodology (Lee et al 1995,  Pflaumer 1992).  Such methods may in fact be more
accurate than the cohort-component method over short time horizons (i.e., up to a few
decades; Pflaumer, 1992; Rogers, 1995), and over longer horizons are useful in defining
a minimum accuracy that more disaggregated methods should achieve to justify their
use (for example, if a cohort-component projection can’t do any better than a simple
extrapolation of growth rates, it may not be worth the additional effort it requires). One
advantage of aggregate methods is that longer time series are available for total
population as compared to the length of series for variables such as age specific fertility
or mortality. Thus direct projections of population size may have more historical
information upon which to draw than do cohort-component projections, which rely on
projections of vital rates. Also, if basic causal factors such as ecological or economic
limits to growth act more directly on total population, rather than on vital rates, it may
make more sense to project total population directly.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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However aggregate time series methods have several drawbacks. For example,
confidence intervals quickly become large, limiting their usefulness for  longterm
projections. In addition, users often desire forecasts not only of total population size,
but of age and sex composition as well. Therefore a disaggregated projection might be
preferable even if it is no more accurate (Note 6). Perhaps more importantly, aggregate
methods do not explicitly take into account the age distribution of a population, which
affects the evolution of its size, and also may miss impending changes in the growth
rate signaled in advance by changes in fertility or mortality (Lee et al 1995).
4.2.2 Microsimulation
In contrast to the cohort-component method, which treats each cohort as a homogenous
group and uses average probabilities of birth, death, and migration, microsimulation
treats each individual independently and uses repeated random experiments instead of
average probabilities (van Imhoff and Post 1998). This technique simulates life events
(marriage, divorce, the birth of children, leaving home, etc.) for each individual, and is
usually based on a sample rather than an entire population in order to reduce
computational demands; results are then scaled to the size of the total population. A
drawback of the microsimulation method is that data requirements can be prohibitive,
since probabilities for each life event must be estimated from event-history data. One
main advantage of  microsimulation is its ability to perform well even with large
numbers of "states," or attributes of individuals. In a cohort-component model, the
computational requirements for the projection quickly become unmanageable as the
number of states increases, since the model must track every possible combination of
states. In contrast, a  microsimulation model  tracks states for each individual in the
sample, which is generally a much more manageable task. Since long-term global
population projections incorporate only two states (age and sex), microsimulation is
unnecessary. However, this method could play a role in studies of the environmental
impacts of household consumption, which might require projections with much more
detail in household characteristics.
4.2.3 Structural models
Long-term global population projections - and most projections over shorter terms or
smaller regions - do not project vital rates based on formal models of how these rates
may be related to socioeconomic factors. Trends in socioeconomic factors are thought
to be harder to predict than the demographic processes themselves (Keyfitz 1982), andDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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relations between demographic and other variables are not generally considered well
known enough to quantify reliably (Cohen 1998). The best known example of an
attempt to formulate a comprehensive, causal model of demographic processes is the
World3 model that served as the basis for the Limits to Growth study in the early 1970s
(Meadows et al 1971). The model projected future trends in population, economic
growth, and natural resource use, and concluded that global society was likely to
collapse in the future due to resource scarcity and environmental degradation. The
model assumed fertility and mortality were complex functions of many factors,
including population size, birth control effectiveness, health services, life expectancy,
income, and industrial output per person. It was strongly criticized for having little
empirical or theoretical basis to substantiate the forms used for these and other
relationships in the model (e.g., Nordhaus 1973).
Recently, however, several researchers have argued that causal models of more
limited scope can contribute usefully to population projections ( Sanderson 1998,
Ahlburg 1998). Some formal models of fertility, mortality, and migration that include
socioeconomic variables (e.g., literacy and female labor-force participation rates) have
been shown to produce more accurate forecasts than models that do not explicitly take
them into account, and averages of results from the two methods performed better than
either approach alone. Combining the results of forecasts produced using a range of
different methods may be a source of innovation in future global population projections
(especially those requiring greater detail about socioeconomic assumptions), although
obstacles remain in selecting which results are of sufficient quality to include in such a
procedure.
4.3 Multistate cohort-component projections
The basic cohort-component method of projecting population focuses on two
characteristics of a population: age and sex. These characteristics are generally
considered a minimum set not only because users are generally interested in them, but
also because they are the most significant source of heterogeneity in the vital rates
essential to projecting population. However, in some cases additional characteristics are
of interest as well. For example, users might be interested in education levels, urban-
rural residence, or the family type of individuals in a population. Even if these
characteristics are not of interest to the user, they may be a significant source of
demographic heterogeneity and therefore could potentially improve the accuracy of
projections of population totals and age structure. Whether accuracy will actually be
improved depends on whether causal factors for the additional characteristics are
identifiable and well understood.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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Projections that take additional characteristics, or "states," of a population into
account are called  multistate projections.  Multistate projections using the cohort
component framework were originally developed in order to account for the place of
residence of population members (Rogers 1975) and have since been extended to other
dimensions. For example, some multistate projections have taken education level into
account since demographic rates are strongly correlated with education levels in many
countries, and educational level is often of interest to projection users (Lutz et al
1998a). In some developing countries education level varies strongly with age (e.g.,
younger cohorts are more educated than their parents), and fertility varies strongly with
education (in general, higher education is associated with lower fertility). Thus as time
passes, women age into their reproductive years with higher levels of education than the
previous members of the reproductive age group, and fertility may be lower than one
would project without explicitly taking education into account. In addition, such
projections show how the composition of the population by educational level might
evolve. For example, building on previous work for specific regions of the world
(Goujon 1997,  Yousif et al 1996), Lutz and  Goujon (submitted) produced the first
global population projections by level of education, generating scenarios for 13 world
regions to 2030. Results show that while at the global level educational composition
changes only slowly and the gap between men and women is likely to persist, outcomes
differ widely across regions. For example, due to large investments in education over
the past several decades, China is likely to see the percentage of women over age 15
with some secondary education rise from 35 to at least 60. On the other hand, South
Asia (mainly India) is unlikely to see the current proportion of 15% rise beyond 25%
even under extremely optimistic assumptions.
A second example of  multistate projections is the projection of households in
addition to population. Van Imhoff and Keilman (1991) developed a multistate model
that they applied to projecting households in the Netherlands; it has subsequently been
applied to many other situations. More recently, Zeng et al (1998) developed a model
that includes marital status (including cohabitation), parity (number of children ever
born), number of children living at home, coresidence, and rural or urban residence.
These models allows investigation of how changes in demographic factors such as
marriage rates or the age at which children leave home can affect not only fertility and
population growth, but also changes in the numbers, size distribution, and composition
of households. This may be particularly relevant to energy and environment
researchers, since household characteristics may be a key determinant of energy
demand (O'Neill and Chen, submitted; MacKellar et al 1995).
Currently, none of the institutions considered here employ multistate methodology
in generating long-term global population projections. Continued development may
make the approach more popular in the future, in particular for consistent projections ofDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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urban versus rural population growth, which is not only an output of interest but also a
significant source of heterogeneity in fertility and mortality. As emphasis on human
capital and investment in education grows, more comprehensive projections
incorporating education may be made as well.
4.4 Uncertainty
Accurately characterizing the uncertainty associated with a population projection is
critical to ensuring that it is used appropriately. Many studies of global environmental
change, for example, rely on a projection assumed to be the “most likely” outcome, and
for this reason it seems widely agreed that it is important to provide users with such a
projection. However, while it seems equally important to provide users with an
indication of the uncertainty associated with the most likely projection, there is no
generally accepted approach to characterizing this uncertainty, and in some cases (for
example the projections of the U.S. Census Bureau) it is not done at all. The recent
report of the U.S. National Research Council (NRC 2000) concluded that insufficient
attention has been given to this issue by agencies making projections, and marks it as a
priority for research. Different approaches to characterizing uncertainty can be grouped
into two main classes: scenarios and probabilistic projections.
4.4.1 Scenarios
The most common approach is to present alternative scenarios that assume higher or
lower vital rates than in the medium or central scenario. Terminology regarding
alternative projections can be confusing. For example, the UN uses the term "variant" to
describe alternative projections in its 1998 Revision, but uses "scenario" to describe
alternative projections in its long-range projections. Lutz et al (1998b) note that the
term "variant" is often used to define a population projection in which the underlying
demographic rates are purely hypothetical and are not assumed to be dependent on
external factors such as socioeconomic conditions. In contrast, the term "scenario,"
which IIASA uses to describe its projections, is defined as a consistent story in which
fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions are embedded to provide a
comprehensive picture of what the future might be. For simplicity, we call all sets of
alternative projections scenarios, with the understanding that the story behind each
scenario may be more or less well defined.
One strength of the alternative scenario approach is that in many cases users may
need alternatives to a single central scenario, but still require self-consistent,Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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independent scenarios rather than confidence intervals around a most likely projection.
These alternative projections can be used in building up more comprehensive scenarios
that may include many other components such as economic growth, technological
development, and greenhouse gas emissions (Gaffin 1998).
However, the approach also has several weaknesses. The most important is that if
no specific level of uncertainty is associated with the alternatives, it is not possible for
users to interpret the precise meaning of the ranges presented. For example, the UN
long-range projections include a high and low scenario in which fertility rates
eventually become constant at about half a birth per woman higher or lower than in the
medium scenario. Because these scenarios produce a global population that doubles or
is halved every 77 years, the UN assumes that these projections are "unsustainable over
the very long run" (UN 1999a, xiii), presumably because they would eventually lead to
extinction or to implausible crowding. It therefore produces intermediate scenarios with
more moderate rates of growth or decline and concludes that future demographic rates
"will very likely be bound by these (intermediate) scenarios if sustainability is to be
maintained" (UN 1999a, xiii). However, despite the arguments ruling out population
collapse or sustained rapid exponential growth, no other qualitative or quantitative
probability is attached to any of the scenarios, nor is any set of socioeconomic
conditions defined under which high or low population growth would be likely to
occur.
Another problem with the scenario approach is that the choice of certain values for
some assumptions may mean that choices for others are unreasonable. For example, the
UN scenarios account for possible variations in fertility paths, but not for variations in
future migration or mortality (except for a constant mortality case used to demonstrate
the relative importance of mortality change to future population growth). On the one
hand this approach simplifies interpretation of differences between projection results,
which clearly demonstrate sensitivity to fertility assumptions alone. It also can be
defended on the grounds that fertility has a larger influence on future population size
and growth rates than either migration or mortality.  On the other hand it has been
criticized on the grounds that it misrepresents plausible future population paths because
the conditions that are likely to be associated with lower fertility in developing regions
are also likely to be associated with lower mortality (and, similarly, higher fertility is
likely to be associated with higher mortality). The IIASA projections provide scenarios
in which each vital rate is varied individually, but also provide scenarios in which
fertility and mortality are varied jointly.
In addition, high or low scenarios assume that vital rates will be higher (or lower)
in all regions simultaneously and over the entire forecast period. While this approach
may provide a better bound on possible future population growth, it probably also tends
to overstate the uncertainty in global population totals since it is likely that significantDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
http://www.demographic-research.org 219
"canceling" would occur: some regions would follow paths higher than the central
assumption while others followed lower paths, reducing the spread of future plausible
paths. Both the UN and IIASA scenarios are subject to this weakness, although IIASA
scenarios are provided at the regional level in such a way that users can choose to
combine regional results from different scenarios and still maintain a self-consistent
global population path (Note 7).
Finally, high and low scenarios intended to bracket the range of possible future
population sizes will not necessarily also bracket the range of possible age structures or
other demographic variables (Lee 1998). For example, although high population growth
is generally associated with a young age structure, a path intended to produce the
largest population will not produce the youngest one. Population grows fastest when
fertility is high and life expectancy is long, but the youngest age structure is produced
when fertility is high and life expectancy is short. Thus the scenario approach does not
accurately reflect relative uncertainties in different demographic dimensions.
4.4.2 Probabilistic projections
An alternative to scenarios as a means of communicating uncertainty is to explicitly
account for uncertainty in projected trends of fertility, mortality, and migration, and
derive the resulting probability distributions for projected population size and age
structure. There have been three main bases for determining the probabilities associated
with vital rates: expert opinion, statistical analysis, and analysis of errors in past
projections.
4.4.2.1 Expert opinion
Among the institutions providing long-term global population projections, only IIASA
provides probabilistic projections. The IIASA methodology is based on asking a group
of interacting experts to give a likely range for future vital rates, where "likely" is
defined to be a confidence interval of roughly 90% (Lutz 1996, Lutz et al 1998b).
Combining subjective probability distributions from a number of experts guards against
individual bias, and IIASA demographers argue that a strength of the method is that it
may be possible to capture structural change and unexpected events that other
approaches might miss. In addition, in areas where data on historical trends are sparse,
there may be no better alternative to producing probabilistic projections.
However, there are a number of obstacles to this approach, including deciding who
constitutes an expert and counteracting the observed conservatism in the projection ofDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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future trends. Lee (1998) questions whether experts can meaningfully distinguish
between different confidence levels they may place on estimates of future vital rates. He
also argues that the method excludes the possibility of fluctuations in vital rates that
deviate from a general trend, which could underestimate uncertainty in outcomes. For
example, there are no scenarios in which fertility starts out high, but ends up low, nor
any scenarios with baby booms or busts. In addition, the possibility of capturing the
potential for structural change may not be unique to the expert opinion approach;
probabilistic projections based formally on errors from past projections implicitly
contain information on past structural changes, such as world wars, the baby boom, the
spread of modern contraception, the introduction of antibiotics, etc. (Lee 1998).
4.4.2.2 Statistical methods
Statistical analysis of historical time series data can be used either to project population
size directly or to generate probability distributions for population size or vital rates.
Lee (1998) argues that, unlike methods based purely on expert opinion, these methods
are capable of producing internally consistent probability distributions. While statistical
methods also employ expert judgment, the mix of subjective and objective
methodology is tilted more toward objective methods than is the expert-based method
used in the IIASA projections. These methods have been applied only to some national
projections (e.g., Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994, Alho 1998), but not to global projections,
so they are not discussed further here. However they may be a source of further
innovation in long-term global projections.
4.4.2.3 Historical error analysis
The analysis of errors in historical projections (see section 5.4) can be used as a basis
for generating uncertainty intervals around a projection produced by some other means.
For example, the NRC report (NRC 2000) produced a probability distribution for the
UN medium scenario for population of individual countries, regions, and the world to
2050 based on analysis of errors in previous UN projections. This method rests on the
assumption that current projections are subject to errors similar to those made in the
past, although trends such as improvements in the quality of data on the initial
population at the start of the projection can be controlled for. It is also limited by the
short record (about 50 years) of past projections. Its strength is that it yields a
probability distribution for a given projection that is consistent with the essential
features of errors observed in the past. For example, errors grow with the length ofDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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projection at a pace based on past experience, and  correlations in errors between
countries or regions and over time can be accounted for. As an illustration, if large
projection errors in some countries at a particular time have generally been associated
with large errors in previous periods, or in neighboring countries, a statistical model
based on historical experience can capture this tendency.
The results of the NRC uncertainty analysis showed that, averaged across 13 large
countries, the 95-percent confidence intervals based on historical error analysis were
more than twice as large as the range defined by the UN high and low scenarios, in both
the short term and after 50 years. At a more aggregate level, this difference declined:
averaged across 10 world regions, the 95-percent confidence intervals in a 50-year
projection were about 40% larger than the UN high-low range. At the global level, the
estimated 95 percent confidence interval was somewhat narrower than the UN high-
low range. This pattern in the comparison of the two ranges occurs because the NRC
analysis takes into account the cancellation of errors at higher levels of aggregation;
that is, projected regional population sizes are less uncertain than projected sizes of the
countries that make them up because over- and under-estimates for countries will cancel
to some extent at the regional level. The same holds true in comparing uncertainty at the
global and regional level. The UN methodology, based on the scenario approach,
cannot take this phenomenon into account, and the high-low ranges are similar at all
levels of aggregation. The NRC analysis also concludes that global population size is
extremely unlikely to begin declining before 2050, even though it does so in the UN
low scenario, and that the probability that the UN median scenario significantly
underestimates future population size, while low, is higher than the probability that it is
a significant overestimate.
4.4.3 Choosing a population projection
Users face a number of choices in selecting demographic inputs for their analyses. The
considerations involved in such choices are many and varied, and depend on the nature
of each application. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the larger
question of how best to integrate demographic projections into integrated analyses, we
offer some suggestions that follow directly from the discussion of different treatments
of uncertainty in this section.
An overarching theme of the general discussion of scenarios and probabilistic
projections is that uncertainty in demographic projections is large. It is therefore
advisable to avoid using a single population projection for any analysis. Either a range
of alternative scenarios, or a probabilistic projection, should be employed to reflect the
inherent demographic uncertainty.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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If it is decided that scenarios will be used, the choice of which population
scenarios or set of scenarios to use should take into account the assumptions on which
they were based and their sources of uncertainty. For example, to avoid internal
inconsistencies, a population projection based on an assumption of slow economic
development and incremental health improvements should not be used in a larger
analysis that is based on a different set of underlying assumptions. This task is made
somewhat difficult by the limited description of underlying assumptions for some
population projections, but should be kept in mind. Users should also keep in mind that
the range of uncertainty in particular demographic variables differs across a given set of
scenarios. Recognizing that the choice of one set of high and low scenarios may bracket
plausible population size ranges, but may not bound the set of plausible age
distributions, would be essential for researchers investigating problems with both size-
and age-sensitive characteristics. A relevant example is the analysis of future pension
systems.
Probabilistic projections are attractive to particular applications, but can also
inform analyses that are explicitly non-probabilistic. For example, some researchers
exploring future scenarios of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions have taken
probabilistic approaches and in the past have relied on deriving their own probability
distributions for demographic parameters (e.g., Fankhauser 1994). This kind of work
could benefit from the recent developments in probabilistic population projections. So,
too, could analyses that explicitly avoid probabilistic interpretations. For example, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently produced an updated set
of scenarios for future greenhouse gas emissions (Nakicenovic et al 2000), with each
scenario corresponding to one of four "storylines" regarding broad social, economic,
and demographic development patterns. A wide range of input variables and resulting
emissions paths are covered, but all scenarios are considered equally sound and
interpretation of likelihood is left up to the user. In this case, users might draw on
probability distributions of demographic projections to help judge how likely the
particular demographic scenario used as a driving force in the IPCC scenarios might be,
and therefore how likely the resulting emissions path itself might be.
One problem with probabilistic projections that must be kept in mind is that,
whether they are based on expert opinion, statistical methods, or historical error
analysis, they are generally unconditional; that is, consideration of future medical
advances, socioeconomic development, and technological progress are all implicit in
the probability distributions for vital rates and therefore for projection outcomes.
However, many uses of population projections require conditional projections,
including the " storyline" approach to developing scenarios of energy use and
greenhouse gas emissions that pre-suppose particular socio-economic, technological, or
political developments (see also  Gallopin et al 1997). While it is possible to makeDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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probabilistic projections taking specific assumptions about determining factors into
account, in practice users generally must rely on unconditional projections. With no
way to adjust the distributions of output to account for different assumptions about
underlying factors, users generally rely on alternative scenarios and must make their
own judgment as to what scenario demographers had in mind when producing it and
how well it matches their own assumptions. While it is unrealistic to expect agencies to
produce conditional projections, better descriptions of the assumptions underlying
scenarios or probability distributions might aid users in adapting them to their own
needs.
Finally, in many cases it would be beneficial to include demographers on an
interdisciplinary research team who can produce projections that are custom-designed
for the question at hand. While this is not always feasible, where it is it would have the
potential to greatly improve the self-consistency and rigor of the analysis.
5. General assumptions
The mechanics of projecting population growth from base year data and assumed future
trends of fertility, mortality, and migration are straightforward and, except for methods
of communicating uncertainty, essentially identical across institutions.  The real
challenge in projecting population lies in accurately determining the characteristics of
the initial population (size, age structure, and vital rates) and in projecting future trends
in vital rates, although it should be kept in mind that these two undertakings differ in a
fundamental way: the characteristics of the initial population can be known with
reasonable accuracy, given enough effort, while future trends in vital rates are
unknowable. It is, in fact, for this reason that the methods for expressing uncertainty
discussed in section 4.4 were developed. All projections of fertility, mortality and
migration used in producing global population projections are based in some manner on
expert opinion informed by current conditions, past trends, and theories about the
determinants of changes in vital rates.
5.1 Baseline data
Accurate baseline data on population size and age structure, as well as on fertility,
mortality, and net migration rates, are critical to producing accurate population
projections (Keilman 1990). So, too, are accurate data on past trends in population
dynamics and vital rates, which play an important role in informing forecasts of future
trends. The primary sources of demographic data are national population censusesDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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performed periodically in most countries of the world. In countries where census data is
nonexistent or considered inaccurate, data from sample surveys are often used.
The United Nations Population Division produces the most widely used
compilation of current and past estimates of population size, age structure, and vital
rates based on these primary sources, and obtaining data and evaluating its quality and
consistency makes up the bulk of the Division's efforts on demographic matters
(Zlotnik, pers. comm.). It must be ensured, for example, that past trends of vital rates
are consistent with past estimates of population size and age structure. In developed
countries, detailed data on fertility and mortality is usually available, along with reliable
periodic census counts. These can be combined to produce a relatively consistent
picture of historical population change in these areas. However, even here data on
international migration is often  inadequate, and complete consistency between vital
rates and population change is often achieved by assigning to net migration the residual
estimate (Zlotnik 1999a).
Estimations for less developed countries are more difficult due to scarce and
sometimes unreliable data. Often indirect estimation techniques must be used,
occasionally by inferring rates and levels from other countries in the same region with
similar socio-economic characteristics. However, over the past 20 years data collection
efforts have increased substantially, and for the UN 1998 revision, 83 percent of all
countries or areas had post-1985 census data available on population size and age
structure (Zlotnik 1999a). Data on vital rates are often derived from surveys and are
more problematic. Information on fertility and child mortality is generally more
available than information on adult mortality. For example, countries accounting for
about 5 percent of global population lacked data more recent than 1990 on fertility and
child mortality. In contrast, countries accounting for 40% of global population lacked
data from the 1990s on adult mortality ( Zlotnik 1999a). This not only makes the
estimation and projection of mortality trends difficult,  but, coupled with unreliable
census data, makes estimation of the baseline age and sex structure of the population
difficult as well.
The US Census Bureau produces its own baseline data, although its estimates
cannot be considered completely independent from those of the UN. Both organizations
rely on the same data sources and use similar techniques for estimating demographic
variables. There are differences between the institutions in when data becomes available
to them and how raw data is analyzed and converted into estimates of demographic
parameters (USCB 1998). However, in practice these differences have been very small
at the global level. For example, estimates of 1990 world population differ by only 0.08
percent. For individual countries, differences can be larger: in 11 countries differences
in population size are 10 percent or more.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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IIASA used baseline data on population size, total fertility rates, and life
expectancies from the Population Reference Bureau's 1995 World Population Data
Sheet (see PRB 2000 for the most recent version), combined with age distributions of
population and vital rates from the UN 1994 Revision (Lutz et al 1996b). The
Population Reference Bureau bases its estimates on the work of the UN, and
independent consideration of other sources including official country statistics, the
Council of Europe, and the U.S. Census Bureau.
5.2 Projecting future fertility
In the long run, the level of fertility has the greatest effect on population growth
because of its multiplier effect: additional children born today will have additional
children in the future. Fertility projections are made by projecting the course of the total
fertility rate (TFR) over time, and translating this total fertility rate into age-specific
fertility rates. In general, the projection of TFR is divided into assumptions regarding a
level at which fertility eventually becomes constant in the country or region, and the
path taken from current to eventual levels. Once fertility reaches its eventual level,
assuming mortality and migration rates are also fixed, the population will eventually
reach a stable age structure and constant growth rate. If the eventual fertility level is at
replacement level and net migration is zero, the growth rate will eventually be zero -
that is, the population will not only be stable, but stationary as well. Both the projected
pace of fertility decline and the assumed eventual fertility level are important to
determining trends in population size and age structure. The two factors also interact:
the lower the assumed eventual fertility level, the more important the pace of fertility
decline becomes to projected population size (O'Neill et al 1999).
5.2.1 Conceptual basis for projections
For countries currently above replacement level fertility, demographic transition theory
serves as the theoretical basis for forecasts. In addition, evidence from surveys indicates
that desired fertility is significantly less than actual fertility in  most less developed
countries (LDCs) where fertility remains high, leading to the expectation of further
declines.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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5.2.1.1 Demographic transition theory
The concept of demographic transition is a generalization of the sequence of events
observed over the past two centuries in the more developed countries (MDCs). While
different societies experienced the transition in different ways, in broad outline these
societies have gradually shifted from small, slowly growing populations with high
mortality and high fertility to large, slowly growing populations with low mortality and
low fertility (Knodel and van de Walle 1979). During the transition itself, population
growth accelerates because the decline in death rates precedes the decline in birth rates.
Empirical evidence from all parts of the world overwhelmingly confirms the
relevance of the concept of demographic transition to  LDCs. The transition is well
advanced in all regions except sub-Saharan Africa, and even here the beginnings of a
fertility decline are becoming apparent. In several countries such as China, Taiwan, and
Korea, fertility is already at sub-replacement levels. In many other countries in
Southeast Asia and Latin America, fertility has fallen to levels seen just a few decades
ago in MDCs.
The biggest difference between the transition in MDCs and LDCs has been the
speed of the mortality decline. In Europe, North America, and Japan, mortality fell
slowly for two centuries as food supply stabilized, housing and sanitation improved,
and progress in medicine was made. In contrast, mortality in LDCs fell over the course
of just a few decades after World War II as Western medical and public health
technology and practice spread to these regions. One result is that LDC populations are
growing much faster than did the populations of MDCs at a comparable stage of their
own transition.
The earliest attempts to explain the demographic transition cited industrialization
and urbanization as the ultimate driving force (Thompson 1930, Davis 1945, Notestein
1945). According to this "classical" transition theory, economic modernization leads to
improvements in health and nutrition that decrease mortality. Modernization also drives
changes in economic and social conditions that make children costly to raise and reduce
the benefits of large families. Eventually, this leads to lower fertility; fertility decline
lags mortality decline because cultural norms regarding reproduction are difficult to
change while improvements in mortality meet little resistance.
The idea that reduced demand for children drives fertility decline was given
theoretical rigor in the 1960s with the development of a theory based on changes in
determinants of parents’ demand for children (Becker 1960, Becker and Lewis 1973,
Becker and Barro 1988), which provided a micro-economic model describing choices
parents are assumed to make between numbers of children and consumption of material
goods at the household level. The model assumes that fertility falls because as societies
develop, parents' preferences shift toward higher "quality" children requiring greaterDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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investments in education and health, while increases in women's labor force
participation and wages increase the opportunity costs of raising children. In addition,
some of the economic benefits parents may derive from children, such as household
labor, income, and old age security, decline as a result of the development process.
Thus, as the net cost of children rises, demand falls.
This framework has been extended and made more flexible by taking into account
sociological aspects. Easterlin (1969, 1975) added supply factors (environmental and
cultural effects on fertility in the absence of regulation) and costs (including the
psychic, social, and monetary costs of fertility regulation) to the focus on demand.
Other explanations have given much more weight to sociological over economic
factors. For example, Ryder (1983) argued that reproductive decisions are not based
strictly on a rational weighting of the consequences of childbearing, but are strongly
influenced by cultural and normative contexts. Caldwell (1982) elaborated a theory that
identified a shift away from extended family structures toward the child-centered
nuclear family as the cause of a reversal in the flow of wealth (money, goods, services,
and guarantees against risk) from children to parents typical in pre-transition societies
to a flow benefiting children. As children displace parents as beneficiaries of the family,
fertility falls. The shift in family structure could be triggered by economic changes, but
also by the spread of new ideas.
Other researchers have emphasized the role of cultural over  socio-economic
factors. Based on analyses of the fertility transition in Western Europe,  Lesthaeghe
(1983) argued that differences in fertility across societies were largely due to
differences in religious beliefs and the degree of secularism, materialism and
individuation. Cleland and Wilson (1987) concluded that ideational change in general,
and the spread of new ideas about the feasibility and acceptability of birth control in
particular, was a key driver in fertility decline and likely more important than changes
in economic conditions. Bongaarts and Watkins (1996) demonstrated that diffusion of
ideas and information about limiting fertility is important. They showed that fertility
transitions typically start in leader countries where development levels are relatively
high, and then spread to other countries in the region, often before they have achieved
the same level of development.
Demographic transition theory has been and continues to be a central focus of
demography (van de Kaa 1996). While there are many ideas, each offering important
insights, no single, simple theory explains the multi-faceted historical experience with
transitions. Each explanation suffers from its own shortcomings, and for each
exceptions can be found (Robinson 1997, Oppenheim Mason 1997). It is likely more
accurate to think of transitions as being driven by combinations of factors rather than
single causes, but determining the precise mix of factors likely to be at work inDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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particular circumstances remains an elusive goal (NRC 2000, Oppenheim Mason 1997,
Kirk 1996, Hirschman 1994).
Although the fact that demographic transition has occurred under so many
different conditions and has likely been driven by multiple causes complicates study of
the subject, in one sense it can be considered a strength where projections are
concerned. It implies that transition is probably inevitable, so that the task of projecting
future fertility in high fertility countries is to anticipate not so much whether countries
will experience this phenomena, but when, how fast, and to what eventual end state.
5.2.1.2 Policies
The role of population policies in the decline of fertility in developing countries over
the past several decades and by extension their potential role in future fertility trends is
a matter of some debate. Implementation of family planning programs has been the
main policy tool in the past (Note 8), and there are two main points of view on their
effectiveness.
Proponents argue that programs have had a substantial effect on fertility primarily
by reducing "unwanted fertility" (births that occur after a woman has reached her
desired family size) below what it otherwise would have been (Potts 2000). The
conventional justification for facilitating this reduction is based on survey data
indicating that many women report wanting to avoid  pregnancy but do not use
contraception. Family planning programs therefore help meet this "unmet need" for
contraception by assisting users in overcoming obstacles to contraceptive use, which
can include limited access to services, lack of knowledge, fear of side effects,
disapproval of families and others, and high cost (Bongaarts and Bruce 1995).
In contrast, Pritchett (1994a, 1994b) has argued that unmet need is much smaller
than commonly assumed, and  that fertility decline is driven primarily by declining
desired fertility (that is, a reduction in the number of children women actually want)
rather than a reduction in unwanted fertility. This conclusion is based on the high
correlation between total and desired fertility, and the lack of correlation between total
and unwanted fertility. He argues that because low fertility countries have low desired
fertility, but not especially low unwanted fertility, the fertility decline must have been
driven by reductions in desired fertility, not by reduced unwanted childbearing. He also
argues that family planning programs have had an insignificant historical effect on
fertility.
Bongaarts (1997) concludes that neither view is fully accurate; rather, both
overstate their case to some extent.  While there is substantial unmet need for
contraception, the portion of it that is relevant to the potential for fertility decline isDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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probably less than commonly cited by advocates of family planning programs, since
these estimates include need for contraception for spacing children and meeting that
need is unlikely to have a substantial effect on fertility. He also concludes that the effect
of programs on unwanted fertility is likely substantial; the critics' view is based on a
misinterpretation of the lack of correlation between total and unwanted fertility, which
clearly exists but is not inconsistent with effective family planning programs. And
finally, he argues that historically programs have in fact had a substantial effect on
fertility: an estimated 43 percent of the fertility decline between the early 1960s and late
1980s was due to program interventions.
Future change in fertility will also depend on the extent and effectiveness of future
policy. At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD)
in Cairo, 179 countries agreed to a Program of Action that marked a fundamental shift
in the motivation for population-related policies away from demographic targets and
toward a new focus on individual well being. The Cairo program set a number of goals
for 2015 that reflected this perspective, among them universal access to comprehensive
reproductive health services (including, but not limited to, family planning); reductions
in infant, child, and maternal mortality; and universal access to primary education, with
an emphasis on closing the "gender gap" between girls and boys. Although these goals
are not primarily motivated by their potential effect on demographic trends, achieving
them would likely lead to lower fertility. Bongaarts (1994) estimated that eliminating
unwanted fertility in developing countries would reduce population in 2100 by about 2
billion, and lowering high desired family size, which could be achieved in part through
the measures advocated in the Program of Action, would reduce population by an
additional billion.
In the global projections discussed here, population policy efforts and
effectiveness are implicitly accounted for, but do not explicitly enter the projection
process. Although program effort and effectiveness can be quantified (Ross and
Mauldin 1996), quantifying their influence on fertility remains difficult. For example,
Mauldin and Ross (1994) took program effort into consideration in their short-term
projections for 37  LDCs, but only in establishing uncertainty, not in the fertility
projections themselves.
5.2.1.3 Eventual fertility
Demographic transition theory provides the theoretical basis for the expectation that
currently high fertility countries will experience, or continue to experience, falling
fertility rates in the future. It provides little guidance, however, on the long-term
average level they might eventually reach. It also has little to offer demographersDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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grappling with the question of future fertility trends in countries that have already
completed the transition to low fertility.
Traditionally, long-term projections have assumed that fertility in all countries
would eventually stabilize at replacement level, leading to a stationary population.
There are two general arguments in favor of this assumption. First, replacement level
fertility may be seen not as the most likely outcome, but as a mathematically convenient
benchmark which prevents population from steadily growing or declining (UN 1999a).
Second, it has been supported on the basis of a systems view which holds that
demographic rates of a population are not just the sum of individual behavior, but also
reflect the tendency of the demographic system to maintain itself (Vishnevsky 1991).
This view sees the falling mortality rates that mark the onset of the demographic
transition as a perturbation of a system in homeostasis; birth rates fall as the system
inevitably re-establishes balance between the two rates, and fertility seeks replacement
level in order to preserve the system. Some researchers have speculated that fertility
could be stimulated to rise to replacement level in currently low-fertility countries by a
wide range of factors, including pronatalist government policies, increased nationalism,
a renewed emphasis on traditional roles for women, or a shift away from materialist
values (Day 1995).
However, the return to replacement fertility has been strongly criticized as an
assumed magnetic force without empirical support (Demeny 1997, Westoff 1991, Lee
1991). Total fertility has been below replacement level in 20 European countries for at
least two decades, and it is currently below 1.5 children per woman in 21 European
countries (UN 1999c). In large parts of several European countries (e.g. Eastern
Germany, Northern Italy, and the most urbanized regions of the Russian Federation),
fertility has been at or below 1.0 (UN 1997b). Several  LDCs have reached
subreplacement level fertility as well (e.g., China, Thailand, and North and South
Korea).
In addition, there are many arguments supporting an assumption of fertility
declines below replacement level.  These can be grouped together under the term
"individuation" (Bumpass 1990), of which there appears to be no end in sight: the
weakening of family ties both in terms of declining marriage rates and high divorce
rates, the increasing independence and career orientation of women, and the value
change towards materialism and consumerism. Individuation, together with increasing
demands and personal expectations for attention, time and also money to be given to
children, is likely to result in fewer couples that have more than one or two children and
an increasing number of childless women. Golini (1998) recently speculated that there
might be an absolute lower limit of about 0.7 to 0.8 children per woman based on the
assumption that 20-30% of women remain childless and the rest have just one child;Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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this would leave room in principle for considerable further decline, but it remains
unclear whether this limit will be relevant to future fertility trends.
Unfortunately, while current trends and some plausible explanations may suggest
continued low future fertility, there is no compelling and quantifiable theory of
reproductive behavior in low-fertility societies. Although fertility typically continues to
fall after reaching replacement level, there is no clear pattern to subsequent fertility
trends. In some countries, fertility falls quickly to very low levels, in others it has made
a more gradual decline, in some such as the U.S. and Sweden it has declined well below
replacement level and then risen nearly to replacement level again (although Sweden
has recently seen another rapid decline) (UN 1997b).
One argument against assuming that total fertility will remain very low in these
countries is that because TFR is a period measure, it is affected by changes in the
timing of births even if the actual number of births women experience over their
lifetime does not change. Since the mean age of childbearing has been increasing in
many industrialized countries over the past several decades, part of the decline in TFR
has been due to this timing effect and not to a change in the completed fertility of
women. Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) therefore argue that TFR is likely to increase in
the future once the mean age of childbearing stops rising, as happened in the 1980s in
the United States when fertility rose to its current value just below replacement level.
An additional argument against continued very low fertility is that in surveys conducted
in much of Europe women consistently say they want about 2 children ( Bongaarts
1999). There are many reasons why women may fail to reach this target (e.g. competing
career plans, divorce, infertility), but this finding suggests that fertility is unlikely to
remain extremely low, especially if societies made it easier for women to combine
careers and childbearing.
However, it may be unlikely that TFR in European countries will return to near
replacement level, even after postponement of childbearing has ceased. This will
depend in part on the extent to which younger women who are currently postponing
births will recuperate some of this delayed fertility at older ages, which will influence
their cohort fertility (Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999). Cohort fertility was already below
replacement level in most European countries for women born between 1945 and 1960
(the most recent cohorts for which reliable estimates of completed fertility can be made)
(UN 1997a).
All institutions select an eventual fertility rate for their projections. Based on
recent trends and current thinking about low fertility (NRC 2000), both the UN and
IIASA have dropped the traditional assumption of convergence to replacement level
fertility  - for all countries in the IIASA projections, and for  MDCs in the UN
projections. Additionally, when projecting eventual fertility levels for the MDCs the
UN now takes into consideration a measure of cohort fertility for the most recent cohortDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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(1962) for which it can safely be estimated. The USCB also assumes that eventual
fertility will be below replacement level in many countries. It projects that currently
high fertility countries will experience a decline to, or slightly below, replacement level.
Other countries generally converge to levels between 1.7 and 2.0.
5.2.2 Feedbacks: Environmental change and fertility
Environmental change has had a historically important effect on various demographic
rates, including fertility. For example, Galloway (1986) found that warmer than average
periods in middle latitudes were associated with above average population levels, and
vice-versa. The suggested mechanism was climatic influence on agricultural output and
food supply per capita. Data from 16
th and 17
th century England show that during cool
periods, grain yield, fertility, life expectancy, and population growth declined, while the
average age at marriage and net out migration increased. Similarly, analysis of data
from China and western Europe between the 13
th and 19
th century indicates that warmer
temperatures have been linked to increases in population growth rates.
Links between environmental change, agriculture, and fertility can be mediated by
a number of factors. Men may leave the community to seek work in adjoining
agricultural regions or in cities (Lee 1990, Hill 1989). Marriages may be delayed
because couples lack financial assets. Expectations and the incremental nature of many
crises also play a role; for example, Dyson (1991) found an anticipatory demographic
response in South Asia, where famines were preceded by extended periods of
worsening adversity during which fertility declined. Caldwell et al. (1986) found that
stress resulting from the 1980-83 South Indian Drought was associated with a
preference for fewer but more educated children.
Ezra (1997) argued that the growing environmental stress and persistent food
insecurity endured by Ethiopian communities over the past two decades stimulated
changes in the demographic behaviors and attitudes of farming communities. He
observed preferences for later age at marriage and smaller family size, a significant
increase in acceptance rates of family planning services, actual reductions in fertility,
increased migration (particularly of the youth) out of the communities, and the tendency
by many farmers to be involved in non-farm income generating activities. It is argued
that demographic transition is faster in ecologically degraded communities than in
relatively stable ones.
However, in all of the above examples the fertility effects traceable to
environmental causes were found to be relatively modest, and the results of studies of
pre-industrial societies are not necessarily relevant to modern societies where many
social, economic, and technological factors have changed and where there is greaterDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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potential for policy to mediate between environmental stress and demographic
responses. Currently, no long-term projections explicitly take into account
environmental feedbacks on fertility. However, in IIASA's probabilistic projections, the
small probability of significant effects are implicitly included in the tails of the fertility




Historically, the medium projection in UN Revisions (which extend to 2050) has
incorporated the assumption of universal convergence to replacement level fertility,
with somewhat higher and lower levels assumed in the high and low variants. Recently,
this approach was abandoned for countries in which fertility is currently below 2.1 (UN
1999d). This change in practice has been based on the observation that the number of
countries with below-replacement fertility is large and increasing. By 1995, 44 percent
of the world population lived in countries where fertility was at or below replacement
level, including several countries in the developing world such as China, North and
South Korea, and Thailand. In many of these countries low fertility has persisted for a
decade or two. Furthermore, in more than 20 countries, including Italy, Spain, and
Germany, fertility has fallen below 1.5 births per woman.
As a result, the medium variant of the 1998 Revision assumes that fertility in
countries where it is below 2.1 in 1990-95 will remain below replacement level until
2050. Low fertility countries are divided into two groups: those with fertility in 1990-95
between 1.5 and 2.1, and those with fertility below 1.5. In the first group, fertility is
projected to rise to 1.9, and in the second to 1.7, and remain constant thereafter
(Note 9). However, in countries with fertility above 2.1 children per woman in 1990-95,
the UN maintains its historical assumption that fertility will undergo a smooth decline
to replacement level and remain constant thereafter.
The pace of fertility decline for currently high fertility countries is determined by
setting a period in which fertility is assumed to reach its eventual level. This
determination is made based mainly on the current level of and recent trends in fertility
in each country, and a comparison to other countries with similar conditions. The
choice of target year has changed little in recent UN Revisions. In currently low fertility
countries, data more recent than the base period (1990-95) was used to extend fertility
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trends to the 2000-05 period. They were subsequently assumed to change at a constant
rate until reaching their ultimate level.
In the high and low scenarios, fertility in countries currently above replacement
level was assumed to eventually stabilize at half a birth per woman above and below
replacement, respectively. Fertility in countries currently below replacement level was
assumed to stabilize at 0.4 births per woman above and below the level it achieved in
the medium variant, respectively (Note 10). The pace of fertility change was adjusted so
that currently high-fertility countries reached ultimate fertility levels in the same target
period as in the medium variant. In low fertility countries, the pace of fertility change
was held constant at a slightly greater rate than in the medium variant.
Once total fertility rates were determined for all countries in all periods, they were
translated to age specific fertility rates. In countries where fertility is currently below
replacement level, age specific rates are generally held constant. In currently high-
fertility countries, age patterns are determined by interpolating between the estimated
current schedule, and one of three model schedules (UN 1999d) for countries that have
completed a fertility transition.
The UN has revised its estimates of current fertility and projections of future
fertility over the past several projection cycles. Figure 2 shows projected fertility for
MDCs and LDCs for the 1990-2050 period for the UN 1994, 1996, and 1998 Revisions.
In 1996, the estimate of LDC fertility in 1990-95 was 3.3, nearly 0.2 births per woman
less than the medium variant projection made in 1994 (which used 1985-1990 as the
base period), and slightly less than even the 1994 low variant. This revision also
lowered projected fertility over the next several decades. Between 1996 and 1998, the
base period TFR was revised only slightly, but projected fertility was lowered further
over nearly the entire projection horizon. The figure also shows that expectations for
future fertility in MDCs have been lowered as well, particularly in the 1998 revision
which discarded the assumption of an eventual rise to replacement level in these
countries. The net differences for projected population totals in 2050 amount to more
than 1 billion: projected population in 2050 dropped from about 10 billion in 1994 to
less than 9 billion in 1998.
Due to these changes, the UN took the unusual step of producing updated long-
term projections to 2150 based on the 1998 Revisions. The previous long-term
projection had been produced just two years earlier, based on the 1996 Revision.
Usually, long-term projections are produced approximately every ten years. Although
the medium variant of the 1998 Revision no longer assumes convergence to
replacement level, the medium scenario of the long-range projections has maintained
this assumption. Thus in currently low-fertility countries, fertility is still below
replacement level in 2050, but is assumed to rise to replacement level 5 to 25 years later
depending on the region (UN 1999a). The reason for this choice appears to be toDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
http://www.demographic-research.org 235
provide a benchmark scenario in which population ultimately stabilizes, not because it
is judged to be the most likely scenario. The projection is described as representing "a
conceptual dividing line between long-range future population increase and long-range
population decline" (UN 1999a, 34).
Figure 2: Total fertility rate for  MDCs and LDCs according to the UN medium
variant in 1994, 1996, and 1998.
5.2.3.2 IIASA
*
IIASA fertility scenarios are based on expert opinion on possible fertility levels in the
period 2030-2035. Based on recent experience and the belief that the demographic
transition is almost certain to continue, it is assumed that fertility in LDCs will continue
to decline. Thus, even in the high scenario, which is based on the possibility that
fertility transition is retarded or stalled, fertility in the period 2030-35 is projected to be
lower than it is today. One exception is China, where the high variant assumes that
fertility rises from 2.0 to 3.0, based on the possibility that the country's one-child policy
could be relaxed and fertility might rise as a result.  The second exception is Latin
America, where it is assumed that fertility stalls in the region as a whole at 3.0 since
there is evidence that such a stall has occurred in particular countries due to
heterogeneous populations in which some segments are well advanced in the
demographic transition while others have hardly started it.
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Low-variant assumptions imply that fertility decline in  LDCs, as has been the
experience in MDCs, does not stop at a TFR of 2.1 but continues to decline, carrying
countries into the range of sub-replacement fertility. The Central assumptions, derived
by averaging High and Low variants, are assumed to represent the most likely case and
result in slightly above replacement-level fertility in 2030-2035 in most LDC regions -
substantially so in sub-Saharan Africa.
In MDCs, the IIASA high scenario assumes a return to replacement level fertility
(or slightly above) by 2030-35 (Note 11). This scenario is taken to be representative of
the systems view of fertility which argues for an inherent tendency of demographic
systems to maintain themselves. The low scenario projects a fertility level of 1.4 in
North America and 1.3 in the other developed regions, with central variants obtained by
averaging high and low assumptions.
Fertility assumptions for all regions were extended into the future by assuming that
in 2080-85, TFR would lie in the range 1.7 - 2.1 in the central scenario, depending on
the population density of the region in 2030-35. The least densely populated region
(South America) was assigned an eventual fertility of 2.1, and the most densely
populated (South Asia) was assigned a level of 1.7. Fertility for other regions was
determined by linearly interpolating between the values for these regions. High and low
scenarios were assigned levels 0.5 above or below the central assumptions. Although
there is some empirical evidence that high population density tends to induce lower
fertility after controlling for other factors, IIASA demographers recognize that this
procedure is still somewhat ad hoc. It is defended on the grounds that it represents an
improvement over what they consider the shaky assumption of eventual replacement
level fertility.
Fertility in all regions is interpolated linearly between assumptions for 2030-35
and 2080-85, and held constant beyond 2080-85. It is also interpolated between the base
period (1990-95) value and 2030-35, although the high and low scenarios "open up"
more quickly over the first five year period to correct for what was considered an
unrealistically small range of uncertainty in the early periods that would have resulted
from a strictly linear interpolation.
5.2.3.3 U.S. Census Bureau
*
The USCB projects future fertility in each country based on a combination of expert
judgment and statistical fits to past trends. Eventual fertility levels for each country are
determined based on the judgment of regional experts. In general, where fertility is
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currently very low it is projected to rise, and where it is very high it is expected to
eventually fall to about 2.0. Other countries generally converge to levels between 1.7
and 2.0.
If more than one historical data point for fertility exists, a logistic function
describing a transition from an initial high fertility level to the assumed eventual level is
fit to the data. Depending on the data and assumptions for a particular country, the
eventual fertility level may or may not be reached before the end of the projection
period in 2050. If no data are available, projections are made based on other countries
with similar experience. Also, if eventual fertility is assumed to differ little from current
fertility, a linear function may be used instead of a logistic.
The plausibility of the projections for each country is then evaluated by USCB
demographers in light of recent population trends, socioeconomic trends, and
population policies. Such factors as trends in age at marriage, the proportion of women
using contraception, the strength of family planning programs, and women's
educational attainment and participation in the labor force are considered. If the
projection for a country is judged to be inconsistent with these trends, the logistic fit is
adjusted until a projection considered to be reasonable is obtained.
As a final check, projected fertility for different countries are compared to make
sure that differences in projections can be explained by known differences in the
characteristics of each country. Age specific fertility rates in each year of the projection
are derived by interpolating between current age specific rates and the rates for a
"model" set derived from empirical data for populations that have already achieved the
levels of fertility projected to be reached in the future.
5.2.3.4 Comparison
Figures 3a and 3b compare projected fertility over the period 1995-2050 for the ten
largest countries according to the UN Medium variant and the USCB projection. It
illustrates some of the differences between the assumptions made by the two
institutions. For example, TFR is considerably higher in Nigeria according to the USCB
over the entire projection period. The figure shows that this is primarily due to a higher
assumed TFR in the initial period in the USCB projection (6.3 vs. 5.7); the two
institutions project roughly equal rates of decline in this country thereafter. For
Indonesia, both institutions assume the same fertility in the base period, but the UN
projects a rapid decline to replacement level and constant fertility thereafter, while the
USCB projects a slower but more sustained fertility decline, eventually falling to 1.8.
For India, the UN again assumes a more rapid decline to replacement level than doesDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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the USCB, although in this case the USCB projection is in agreement on the eventual
fertility level.
Figure 3a: Total fertility rate projections for the ten largest countries according to
the UN Medium variant (dashed lines) and the US Census Bureau (solid
lines), for each five-year period between 1990 and 2050.  USCB values
two years into each five-year period are taken as representative of the
average over the period.
Figure 3b:
Differences between the two institutions' projections for Brazil and the U.S. are
striking. In both cases, the UN and the USCB assume very similar fertility levels in the
base period, but the UN projects a decline in U.S. fertility to below replacement level




















































































Japan-USCBDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
http://www.demographic-research.org 239
reversed for Brazil: the USCB projects a decline to substantially below replacement
level (1.7), while the UN foresees a decline that stalls at replacement level.
Differences between institutions are small for China: the USCB assumes TFR
remains essentially constant at 1.8, while the UN assumes a slow increase from 1.8 to
1.9. In Russia, both institutions agree on a current TFR of about 1.3, but the UN
projects a rise to 1.7 while the USCB projects a more rapid rise to 1.7, then a fall to 1.5,
thus ending up below the UN projection for 2050
5.3 Projecting future mortality
Mortality projections are based on projecting future life expectancy at birth for males
and females, defined as the average lifespan of a child born today if current age-specific
mortality levels were held fixed in the future. Life expectancy (like the total fertility
rate), is a period measure, and does not reflect the actual experience of a particular
individual. Nonetheless, it provides a useful summary of the prevailing age specific
mortality rates to which a population is exposed at a particular time. Mortality
projections must also specify how mortality is distributed over different age groups for
both sexes, and how these distributions may change over time. For example, gains in
life expectancy can come from declines in infant mortality rates, or from lower
mortality for older age groups; changes in mortality at different ages, even if they have
equal impacts on life expectancy, have different consequences for population growth
and age structure.
5.3.1 Conceptual basis for projections
Uncertainties about future changes in life expectancy are quite different in high and low
mortality countries. Low mortality countries, primarily in the more developed regions,
have seen impressive increases in life expectancy to levels that used to be considered a
biological upper limit to the human life span. Assumptions about future improvements
depend crucially on whether or not such a limit exists and how soon it might be
reached. In developing countries where mortality remains high, future life expectancy
will be determined by the efficiency of local health services, the spread of traditional
(e.g., malaria) and new (e.g., AIDS) diseases, and the general standards of living and
education. The gap in life expectancy between MDCs and LDCs has narrowed over the
past 50 years, and is likely to narrow further unless the AIDS epidemic stalls further
progress in a significant fraction of LDCs.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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5.3.1.1 Life expectancy
In  MDCs, mortality is concentrated at old ages, so uncertainty about future life
expectancy is based on uncertainty about future death rates among the elderly. Death
rates have been declining steadily for this age group, but there are a range of opinions
on how long this trend can continue.
One point of view is that life expectancy in MDCs is unlikely to increase from its
current level of about 75 years to much beyond 85 years. Some argue that this age
represents an intrinsic (i.e., genetically determined), unmalleable limit to the human
lifespan (Fries 1980). Therefore, improvements in mortality that do occur are likely to
increase the chance of survival to the maximum  lifespan, but not to extend the
maximum itself. Others argue that while the intrinsic limit may be modifiable, in
practical terms it is unlikely to be exceeded without unforeseeable medical
breakthroughs (Olshansky et al 1990, Olshansky 1997, Harman 1991). This view is
based on calculations showing that increasing life expectancy to 85 years would require
dramatic reductions in mortality rates, particularly among the elderly. Since complete
elimination of deaths from major fatal diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and
diabetes would not extend life expectancy beyond 90, these dramatic reductions are
considered unlikely to occur.
However, a second point of view is that  substantial improvements in life
expectancy due to reduced old-age mortality are possible. Data from several developed
countries shows that death rates at old ages have been falling over the past several
decades, and this improvement has been accelerating, not decelerating as would be
expected if a limit were being approached (Vaupel 1997a, 1997b). In attempting to
understand this trend, researchers are investigating the evolutionary basis for aging
(Kirkwood 1997).  Evolutionary biologists and  biodemographers theorize that
senescence is an inadvertent consequence of sexual reproduction. Genes responsible for
lethal diseases that occur in post-reproductive years evade the influence of natural
selection because, unlike genes associated with diseases earlier in life, they are passed
on before they are expressed (Rose 1999, Olshansky et al 1998). Thus mortality rates
inevitably rise beyond the reproductive period. Intriguingly, increases in mortality
decelerate at older ages, not only in humans but in several other species as well (Vaupel
1997c). As of yet, no single evolutionary theory satisfactorily explains this empirical
finding.
The likelihood that biological or practical obstacles to overcoming this genetic
legacy will be surmounted in the foreseeable future remains an open question. If they
are, a significant increase in life expectancy could have a large impact on projected
population. For example, Vallin and Caselli (1997) show that if life expectancy were to
increase to 150 years over the next two centuries, global population will stabilize at aDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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level twice as high as it would if life expectancy did not exceed 85 years. Short of this
more extreme outcome, a recent review (NRC 2000) concluded that future medical
advances and the possibility of breakthroughs supports the likelihood of continued
steady gains in life expectancy in industrialized countries.
In LDCs, possible limits to the lifespan are not as relevant to projections since life
expectancies are lower and mortality is not as concentrated at the oldest ages. Life
expectancy in LDCs increased from about 40 in the 1950s to just over 60 in the early
1990s (UN 1999c), a remarkable achievement driven mainly by reductions in mortality
due to infectious disease. Regional progress was variable, with the slowest gains in sub-
Saharan Africa and the fastest in China, where life expectancy reached 68 in the 1990s.
Projecting mortality in LDCs is made difficult by the relative scarcity and poor quality
of data on current and past trends. In addition, the future course of the AIDS epidemic
could substantially affect mortality in many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa
where HIV prevalence rates are especially high.
Life expectancy is an explicit assumption of each projection. The assumptions
used by each institution are discussed below.
5.3.1.2 New epidemics (HIV/AIDS)
The impressive gains in life expectancy in the LDCs over the past several decades has
in many countries been slowed or, in the most serious cases, even reversed due to the
impact of AIDS. Sub-Saharan Africa has been most affected. For example, in Botswana
life expectancy has dropped from about 63 years in the late 1980s to below 50 in the
late 1990s, and Zimbabwe has seen life expectancy fall from 57 to 44 years over the
same period (UN 1999c). By subjecting members of the most economically active and
productive groups to a premature death, AIDS is imposing an enormous economic and
social toll on the continent (Ainsworth and Over 1994).
The effects of AIDS on population growth and age structure could be significant in
affected countries. The  U.N. (1999b) estimates that for the 29 African countries in
which it adjusts its projections to account for AIDS, population size will be on average
8.1 percent lower in 2015 than it would be without any deaths from AIDS. This
represents a 5.4 percent difference in the population of Africa as a whole. In the nine
most affected countries, the impact is projected to be nearly 15 percent.
Independent simulations suggest that impacts in some countries may be even
greater. Population size may well decline in Botswana (Sanderson 1998), where the
HIV prevalence rate is estimated to be well above 30%. Moreover, the age structure
will become severely distorted and AIDS orphans, rising health expenditures, and a
worsening health status of the labor force are likely to present major macroeconomicDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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problems in addition to immense human suffering. The ultimate impact of AIDS on the
population of Africa as a whole will be moderate if exceptionally high HIV prevalence
rates exist only in Botswana and a few other countries with special conditions. If high
prevalence rates turn out to be more widespread, AIDS could have a significant impact
on African population dynamics.
For selected countries, AIDS mortality is taken explicitly into account by altering
assumptions. These are identified below.
5.3.2 Feedbacks: Carrying capacity and health
Environmental change has had important direct or indirect effects on mortality in the
past. For example, climate change is likely to have contributed to the collapse of the
Classic Maya culture in Yucatan (A.D. 800–1000; Lutz et al 1996b) and the decline of
the Easter Island civilization in the 18
th and 19
th centuries (Brander and Taylor 1998).
Yet these massive disruptions occurred in a context of extremely limited technical
capacity to respond to change; their relevance to future environmental change is
unclear. The most frequently discussed possibilities for future effects center around the
idea of carrying capacity and the potential health impacts of climate change. Currently,
however, population projections do not take explicit account of possible environmental
feedbacks on mortality, based on the belief that they are unlikely to be strong enough to
be an important determinant of future mortality trends (NRC 2000).
The concept of carrying capacity has its roots in ecology and the population
biology of non-human species. Simple models of population growth that assume a limit
to population size give rise to a logistic—or S-shaped—growth pattern, in which
population size increases quickly at first, then more slowly as it approaches its ultimate
limit. There is a long history of estimates of the Earth's human carrying capacity, based
mainly on the idea that a growing population will eventually trigger an increase in death
rates as it pushes up against the limit of the planet to provide the resources necessary to
support life. Proposed limits have been based on a wide range of factors, including
energy, agriculture,  water, mineral resources, disease, and biological diversity. No
consensus on the human carrying capacity has emerged; on the contrary, the range of
estimates has widened over time (Cohen 1995).
There are at least three reasons that carrying capacity is not considered in long-
term population projections. First, there is no agreement on what the limiting factors to
population growth might be. Any proposed limit relevant to projections over the next
century or two would be strongly dependent on which factor or factors were assumed to
be limiting, as well as on the how thinly any one factor had to be spread to begin to
exert its limiting influence. For example, while food is often taken as a limiting factor,Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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the maximum population that could be fed would depend on, among other things, the
typical diet, agricultural productivity (which itself would depend on technology,
agricultural research, irrigation, etc.), the allowable fraction of land usable for
agriculture (which itself would depend on the value attached to biodiversity and the
existence of wilderness), and so on. In addition, a factor that may be limiting in one
region may be available in excess in another, and therefore the possibility of inter-
regional trade would have to be considered as well.
Second, even if the relevant factors could be agreed on, it may be too difficult to
project the future evolution of those factors to be of use in population projections
(Keyfitz 1982). Future agricultural systems, energy supplies, and water availability are
difficult to foresee in their own right, and there is no consensus in these areas to which
demographers might turn. Third, even if these factors could be reliably predicted, their
effects are mediated through economic, political, and cultural systems in ways that are
not possible to quantify with confidence (Cohen 1998). Thus, even projections
contingent on projected developments in other areas would be highly uncertain.
Although no long-term projections routinely take carrying capacity into account,
some researchers (Cohen 1998, NRC 2000) have argued that it may be worth
considering limiting factors when projecting population, especially over long time
horizons, in particular locations where resources are especially limiting and potential
for trade is low, or when the intention is to warn against an undesirable outcome, to
describe a path to a desirable state, or to analyze the consequences of some hypothetical
relationship between demographic factors and constraints. Lutz et al. (1996) examined
the potential demographic consequences of an assumed carrying capacity of 2.5 billion
for Sub-Saharan Africa as an illustration of how such an exercise might be carried out.
They demonstrated that if a catastrophe due to war, famine, disease, or some other
means resulted in a sudden 20% increase in mortality and left fertility unchanged at a
high level, the population of the region would regain its 20% loss within 10-15 years.
However, the demographic recovery depends on the age and sex structure of the
mortality reduction as well as on assumptions regarding fertility, so that incorporating
carrying capacities into population projections requires more detailed accounting of the
effects of a catastrophe than is commonly assumed.
In addition, some projections implicitly take environmental  feedbacks into
account. For example, while the UN projections do not consider possible feedbacks
(UN 1999a), the IIASA methodology for developing probabilistic projections directed
experts to consider ecological catastrophes in their estimates of confidence intervals for
future vital rates. Thus the tails of the probability distributions for these rates can be
considered to account for the possibility of strong  feedbacks from environmental
changes.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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Environmental effects on mortality short of a large-scale catastrophe have received
increasing attention recently, especially those that might be driven by future climate
change. Climate change could lead to the spread of infectious diseases beyond their
traditional boundaries of occurrence or contribute to the spread of new diseases. There
is also concern about the health consequences of the potential for more frequent and
severe heat waves and other extreme events.
The spread of infectious diseases could be exacerbated by climate change as
warmer temperatures extend the ranges and accelerate the lifecycles of mosquitoes and
other disease vectors. Several studies have examined the effect of interannual climate
variability on diseases such as malaria, schistosomiasis, sleeping sickness, dengue, and
yellow fever in order to characterize links between climate variables and infection.
Loevinsohn (1994) associated a 1 degree Celsius increase in the average temperature in
Rwanda in 1987 with a 337% rise in the incidence of malaria that year. Other studies
link malaria outbreaks over the past several decades in South Asia and South America
with the El  Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon, which periodically
disrupts climate in particular regions around the world (Epstein 2000). Colwell (1996)
attributes outbreaks of cholera in Latin America and Bangladesh in the early 1990s to
ENSO events as well, although she noted that the epidemics behaved differently in
Latin America according to prevailing levels of poverty, health education, sanitation,
and other risk factors. Other studies have shown that one of the prime carriers of dengue
and yellow fever – the  Aedes  aegypti mosquito –  has extended its range to higher
elevations in such diverse regions as Costa Rica, Colombia, India, and Kenya (Epstein
1999).
If climate change leads to an increase in the frequency and/or intensity of extreme
events, health conditions will be affected, particularly in developing countries
(International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 1998). For
example, the intense precipitation and flooding associated with hurricanes often spawns
clusters of disease outbreaks, including cholera (a water borne disease), malaria and
dengue fever. Severe drought often triggers migration, which can facilitate the spread of
infectious diseases (McMichael et al 1996).
The ultimate mortality impact of these environmental health risks is uncertain. Yet
even the most pessimistic forecasts for additional deaths, when spread over large
populations, do not significantly change the general outlook for mortality globally.
Thus while they may be of real concern, they are not explicitly considered in producing





The UN projects a single mortality path for all scenarios of its population projections to
2050. In the 1998 Revision, it assumes that all countries will eventually reach a
maximum life expectancy of 87.5 years for males and 92.5 years for females. The pace
of change is determined by assigning one of three models of change in life expectancy
to each country (fast, medium, and slow change) based on recent experience and on the
idea that improvements in life expectancy will slow as life expectancy grows. Countries
may be assumed to switch from one model to another in 2025. No country actually
reaches the maximum life expectancy by 2050, and only North America reaches this
maximum by 2150 in the long-term projections, but it is the implicit end point of all
paths. The projected life expectancies are translated into age-specific mortality rates by
interpolating between the estimated current life table and a model ultimate life table for
each region.
The impact of HIV/AIDS on mortality is explicitly taken into account for 34
countries—29 of them in Africa—where prevalence rates are above 2%, plus Brazil and
India where prevalence was still low but had a large number of infected persons (UN
1999b). Models are used to estimate the annual incidence of the disease (i.e., annual
number of newly infected individuals) based on recent estimates of prevalence (i.e., the
total number of HIV-positive individuals at particular points in time). The annual
number of deaths from AIDS is then estimated based on assumptions about the
probability of progressing from HIV infection to AIDS and from AIDS to death. These
additional deaths are then used to revise the projected mortality rates for a country.
A recent revision to the UN methodology was the addition of five-year age groups
between 80 and 100 years of age. Previously, the oldest age group had been the open-
ended 80+ group. Currently, it is the 100+ age group. The addition of these groups was
made difficult by the scarcity of mortality data for the elderly.
UN projections of life expectancy have changed little in recent years, with a
slightly less optimistic outlook for LDCs (see Figure 4). The projection of a rise in LDC
life expectancy from its current level of about 62 years to 75.5 years in 2050 is about 1
year less than the rise to 76.4 years envisioned in the 1994 revision. This change is
primarily due to new data on the extent and implications of HIV/AIDS mortality.
Over a longer time period, the UN has consistently revised upward its assumptions
on the limits of life expectancy (Bucht 1996). For example, in 1973 it was assumed that
the highest life expectancies would be 77.5 years for women and 72.6 years for men, as
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compared to 87.5 and 82.5 years in the 1996 Revision. In the most recent long-term
projections, life expectancy can rise as high as 92.5 years.
The UN long-range projections include for the first time scenarios in which
mortality is assumed to remain constant after 2050, for the sake of comparison to its
scenarios with continued declines in mortality.
Figure 4: Projected life expectancy at birth in MDCs and LDCs according to the
UN medium variant in the 1994, 1996, and 1998 revision.
5.3.3.2 IIASA
*
Unlike the UN, IIASA uses three different scenarios for mortality change. The low
mortality scenario projects improvements in MDCs of three years per decade, slightly
greater than recent trends in Western Europe and North America, but slower than recent
improvements in Japan. The high scenario projects increases of one year per decade in
developed country regions. The central scenario, as an average of the high and low,
assumes a two-year per decade increase in life expectancy. An exception was made for
European parts of the former Soviet Union, where the low and high scenarios were set
to four and zero years per decade increases; the latter assumes a continuation of difficult
socioeconomic conditions that have been associated with a recent decline in life
                                                          




































1998Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
http://www.demographic-research.org 247
expectancy in the region, and the former assumes a recovery and adoption of more
Western lifestyles.
In LDC regions, life expectancy is also assumed to increase at one, two or three
years per decade in the high, central, and low mortality scenarios, with several
exceptions. For sub-Saharan Africa, the range was extended to improvements of four
years per decade in the low mortality case to allow for the possibility of a process of
catching up with other regions of the world, and a decline of two years per decade in the
high mortality case to take into account the possible impact of AIDS and potential food
shortages. The central scenario therefore assumes slow improvements of one year per
decade. South Asia and Pacific Asia are also assigned a wider range to take into account
uncertainty associated with AIDS (zero, two and four years per decade in the high,
central, and low mortality scenarios). In South Asia and China, life expectancy is
assumed to increase more rapidly for women on the assumption that differential
treatment of girls in these societies, which has probably depressed female life
expectancy, eases in the future. Finally, in North Africa and the Middle East, the range
of possible mortality changes was widened to 0.5 - 4 years to account for their greater
potential for improvement.
To define current age distributions of mortality, IIASA projections use observed
age-specific patterns of mortality for developed country regions, and UN model life
tables for developing countries. In regions significantly affected by AIDS, adjustments
were made to account for assumed age patterns of AIDS mortality. Age patterns of
mortality were held fixed through time, and scaled to changing life expectancies.
5.3.3.3 U.S. Census Bureau
*
The USCB projects future life expectancy in each country in a manner similar to the
UN methodology. Maximum life expectancies of 82.6 years for men and 88.4 years for
women are assumed based on the lowest cause-specific mortality rates currently
observed anywhere in the world. These minimum cause-specific rates are combined
into a single set of mortality rates from which the maximum life expectancies are
calculated. The pace of change from current life expectancies is determined using a
relationship that assumes that gains in life expectancy diminish as life expectancy itself
increases. No country reaches the maximum life expectancy by the end of the projection
period in 2050.
Age-specific mortality rates in each year of the projection are derived by
interpolating between current age specific rates and the rates for a "model" set
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representative of low mortality conditions. In 28 countries where the risk of death from
AIDS is significant, mortality is explicitly adjusted by modeling the spread of HIV
infection and the development of AIDS. Countries where the urban low-risk population
had reached or would soon reach a seroprevalence rate of 5% were selected (USCB
1999). They consisted of 21 countries from sub-Saharan Africa and seven from
elsewhere (Guyana, Burma, Haiti, Cambodia, Honduras, Brazil and Thailand; Note 12).
The model projects the course of the epidemic through 2010 based on current and
historical data. Growth in HIV infection is assumed to peak in that year, and AIDS
mortality is assumed to decline to zero by 2060.
5.3.3.4 Comparison
Figure 5 compares projected life expectancy over the period 1995-2050 for the ten
largest countries according to the UN Medium variant and the USCB projection. In
most of the 10 countries shown, assumptions regarding mortality are similar between
the two institutions. There are several exceptions. In Brazil, the USCB projects a
decline from 67 to 63 over the first 15 years, and then a rise to 78 by 2050. In contrast,
the UN assumes a steady rise from 66 to 76 over the same period. Similarly, in Nigeria
the USCB projects a decline from 53 to 48 over the next 15 years, followed by a rise to
69 by 2050. The UN projects a sustained rise from 50 to 69 over the same period. As a
result, the USCB life expectancy projections for these two countries are substantially
below that of the UN for most of the projection period. These differences are due
primarily to assumptions regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS (Note 13). In Pakistan, the
USCB projection is consistently below the UN projection by 2-4 years throughout the
projection period. Most of this gap is due to a difference in the assumption regarding
current life expectancy, which is lower by about 4 years in the USCB projections.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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Figure 5a: Life expectancy projections for the ten largest countries according to the
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5.4 Projecting future migration
Future international migration is more difficult to project than fertility or mortality.
Migration can be volatile since short-term changes in economic, social, or political
factors often play an important role. In addition, since no single, compelling theory of
migration exists, projections are generally based on past trends and current policies;
however, data on historical migration are sparse.
Although fertility generally has a larger impact on long-term population growth,
migration can exert a strong influence as well. In the early 1990s, for example, net
international migration accounted for nearly half of the population growth rate in MDCs
(UN 1998b, ch. 1). In particular regions and countries, effects are even more striking.
The population of Western Europe grew at an annual rate of 0.6 % over the period
1990-95, and migration accounted for over 80% of that rate. Migration also accounts
for substantial fractions of the growth rates in the United States, Canada, and Australia.
Growth rates in Italy, Germany, and the Russian Federation would have been negative
without migration. Recently, the UN has undertaken an exercise to project levels of
“replacement migration” in low-fertility countries out to 2050; that is, country-specific
rates of in migration required to maintain, in the face of continued low fertility, a given
population size, the size of working-age (15-64 years) population, and the ratio of
working-age to old-age population (or support ratio) (UN 2000a). Results showed that
the size of the required migration streams were implausibly large compared to current
net immigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations, especially in the case
of migration needed to maintain the support ratio (PDR 2000).
In contrast, migration had only a small negative impact on the 1990-95 growth rate
of LDCs considered as a whole. However, migration within developing regions played
an important role in growth at the national level. For example, a third of Mozambique's
nearly 4% annual growth rate was due to in-migration, mainly the return of refugees
from Malawi. Similarly, while Guinea grew at nearly 6% per year, its growth rate
would have been 4% without migration, which consisted largely of refugees from
Liberia.
5.4.1 Conceptual basis for projections
Projections of international migration generally begin with consideration of current and
historical trends ( Zlotnik 1998, NRC 2000). For example, most projections foresee
continued net migration into traditional receiving countries such as the U.S., Canada,
and Australia. These trends may then be modified based on potential changes in
underlying forces affecting migration. These forces are complex, and no single factorDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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can explain the history of observed migration trends. For example, population growth
rates in sending regions are not a good indicator of emigration flows. In general,
correlations between rates of natural increase in developing countries and levels of
emigration to developed countries have been weak or nonexistent (Zlotnik 1999b).
There are a number of theories that attempt to explain migration from different
disciplinary perspectives (Massey et al 1998, UN 1998b, ch. 8). Economic approaches
see international migration mainly as a mechanism for redistributing labor analogous to
the process of rural-urban migration within countries (e.g.,  Todaro 1976). From a
macroeconomic perspective, labor flows are assumed to be driven by wage differences,
implying that populations will tend to redistribute until wage rates differ only due to
migration costs. Individuals decide to migrate based on weighing the estimated benefits
against the costs of moving. Therefore, the choice of destination will depend on where
they perceive their skills to be most productive. The socio-economic environment of the
country of origin clearly plays a role as well, however. For example, migrants usually
do not belong to the lowest income classes in their countries of origin, and emigration
appears more likely to occur in countries that have already attained a certain level of
development and are advancing in the development process rather than in countries
stagnating at low levels of development (UN 1998b, ch. 8).
The basic neoclassical model emphasizing the labor market is generally regarded
as an important component of explanations of migration, but has been extended to
address recognized shortcomings. So-called "new economics" models assume that
migration decisions are not strictly individual but are affected by the preferences and
constraints of families. Decisions are made not only to maximize income, for example,
but are also strongly influenced by family or household demand for insurance. By
diversifying family labor, households can minimize risks to their well being (Stark
1991).
A different approach theorizes that demand for migrant labor is inherent to the
economic structure of developed countries ( Piore 1979). Reasons include an
occupational hierarchy that requires the existence of a low-wage, low-skill class to
maintain relative status; bifurcated labor markets in which one class of jobs are unstable
and unskilled; and the shrinking number of native workers, historically women and
teenagers, willing to accept such positions.
Other researchers have argued that migration theory is incomplete without
consideration of political factors, especially to explain why international flows are
much lower than would be predicted based solely on economic costs and benefits
(Zolberg 1981). Since a fundamental function of the state is to preserve the integrity of
a society by controlling entry of foreigners, explanations must balance the interests of
the individual with those of society as expressed through migration policies.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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The various factors influencing migration decisions are often categorized
according to whether they attract migrants to a region of destination ("pull" factors),
drive migrants out of regions of origin ("push" factors), or facilitate the process of
migration ("network" factors) (Martin and Widgren 1996). In addition to the factors
evoked by the theories discussed above, others might include the need to flee life-
threatening situations, environmental change (see below), the existence of kin or other
social networks in destination countries, the existence of an underground market in
migration, and income inequality and changes in cultural perceptions of migration in
sending countries that are induced by migration itself (Massey et al 1993, UN 1998b).
Projections of net migration are incorporated into all population projections, as
described below.
5.4.2 Feedbacks: Environmental refugees
The potential for growing numbers of "environmental refugees" - people driven to
migrate by environmental factors - has received increasing attention since the term was
introduced in the mid-1980s (El-Hinnawi 1985). However, there is wide disagreement
on the relevance of environmental change to migration (Suhrke 1994). At one end is the
view that environmental conditions are just one of many "push" factors influencing
migration decisions ( MacKellar et al 1998). Environmental change, in this view,
primarily acts indirectly by reducing income (by, for example, reducing agricultural
productivity), making income less stable, or negatively affecting health or
environmental amenities. It also acts in concert with other factors, and therefore its
relative role is difficult to isolate.
At the other end lies the view that deteriorating environmental conditions are a key
cause of a significant number of migrants in developing countries (Myers 1997, 1995;
Jacobsen 1988, El-Hinnawi 1985). While other factors such as poverty and population
growth may interact with environmental change, environmental degradation is assumed
to play a principal role.
This disagreement is reflected in the controversial nature of the definition of the
term "environmental refugees" and of estimates of their numbers. Myers (1995) defines
environmental refugees as "persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their
traditional homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably
drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change,
also natural disasters…" and who "feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance
elsewhere." Others have argued that the term "refugee", with its associated image of
human misery and chaos, overstates the case. The United Nations High Commission on
Refugees defines a refugee as someone who has a "well-founded fear of beingDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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persecuted" in his or her country of origin "for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (UN 1951). Many African
and Latin American states have extended the definition to include people who have fled
from their homeland to escape from generalized violence, internal conflict, and serious
disturbances to public order (UN 1998b,  ch. 5).  Still, it is argued, "refugees" are
commonly understood to be people who have left their region of origin involuntarily
and in haste and are generally powerless and vulnerable in their new location, while
migrants move voluntarily and are in a much stronger position in their new residence
than refugees (MacKellar et al 1998). Acute environmental changes such as floods may
cause sudden population movements that might be described as refugee flight, but
people moving in response to chronic drought, progressive deforestation, and other
types of environmental degradation are more appropriately defined as environmental
migrants (Suhrke 1994).
The debate is more than academic. On the one hand, refusal to accept the "refugee"
terminology has been equated with a refusal to recognize the issue as an important
concern ( Ramlogan 1996); on the other, the spread of the environmental refugee
concept has been claimed to risk distracting attention from the pressing issues of
refugees as traditionally defined (Suhrke 1994).
The degree to which environmental migration is relevant to long-term projections
depends in part on the anticipated magnitude of the population movements. Myers
(1995) estimates that environmental refugees (by his definition) currently number at
least 25 million (over half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa), a figure that is roughly equal
to the number of refugees and displaced persons as traditionally defined (UN 1998b, ch.
5, Note 14). In comparison, there are an estimated 125 million international migrants,
i.e., people living in a country other than the one in which they were born (UN 1998b;
Martin and Widgren, 1996). Myers predicts that the number of environmental refugees
is likely to double by 2010, and could swell to 200 million by 2025 due to the impacts
of climate change and other sources of environmental pressure.
The potential relevance of these figures to population projections also depends on
the level of aggregation. Most environmental migration occurs within national
boundaries and therefore would not affect any of the long-term projections. For the
IIASA and UN long-range projections, which are based on regions consisting of several
countries, much of the international migration would be masked as well. In addition, if
environmental migration occurs in the future, its relevance compared to other factors
driving migration, such as economic imbalances, must be weighed before concluding it





For the purposes of projecting net migration, the UN divides countries into three broad
groups: those projected to have zero net migration at all times; those projected to have
non-zero net migration in the short to medium term, but zero migration thereafter; and
those projected to have nonzero migration throughout the projection period of the 1998
Revision. This represents a significant break from previous Revisions, which assumed
that migration fell to zero everywhere in 2025. The first group comprises about a
quarter of all countries and areas, and includes countries in which in-migration and out-
migration currently is not significant. The second group is much larger and includes
countries that have been involved in flows of forced migrants, those that have a history
of emigration or net out-migration but have not been experiencing large flows recently,
and those that do not have such a history but have been experiencing significant net
migration recently. The third group includes the traditional countries of immigration
(Australia, Canada, and the U.S.), countries with a recent experience of net in-migration
(Russian Federation and Germany), and traditional sources of migrants (Algeria, China,
India, Mexico, the Philippines, etc.).
For its long-range projections, the UN considers migration too uncertain to project
and therefore assumes that net migration is zero in all regions beyond the time horizon
of the shorter term projections produced for the 1998 Revision (UN 1999a).
5.4.3.2 IIASA
**
The IIASA migration scenarios are devised by determining a constant annual migration
level for each region for the high scenario. In the low scenario, zero net migration is
assumed. The central scenario is defined as the average of the high and low. Although
migration streams will almost certainly vary in the future, constant values were
assumed to be the most reasonable approach given the potential for volatility driven by
unpredictable policy changes. Migration patterns in the less developed countries are
based primarily on recent trends, as are the assumed destinations of migrants leaving
sending regions. In the central scenario, the traditional receiving regions continue to
absorb large migrant flows of the roughly the same magnitude as recent trends (e.g., 1
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million annually to North America, 500 thousand to Western Europe, 175 thousand to
Pacific Asia). The age patterns of migrant streams are based on model migration
schedules from Rogers and Castro (1981).
5.4.3.3 U.S. Census Bureau
*
For countries in which migration currently has an insignificant impact on its growth
rate, future migration is often assumed to be zero. For countries with significant
migration, future migration is often held constant at current levels into the near future,
and then is assumed to diminish to zero in the medium to long term, with the timing of
these changes varying from country to country. Age and sex compositions of migration
streams are based on current data or on data from similar countries. Migration flows are
adjusted so that out-migration is nearly equal to in-migration for the world as a whole.
A small imbalance may remain, although it has a negligible effect on results.
6. Projection outcomes
Clearly, given the difficulties of establishing baseline data and the inherent uncertainty
in projecting trends in vital rates, there is the potential for different population
projections to produce widely varying population sizes, age structures, and
distributions. An examination of projections from various institutions shows that results
do indeed span a wide range; however, there are some similarities between central or
"most likely" projections and also between plausible ranges of population size as
projected by different institutions.
6.1 Population size
Figure 6 shows a summary of global population projections from the UN, IIASA, and
the U.S. Census Bureau. The central or "most likely" scenarios from these institutions
are similar in some respects, differing by about 10% in 2050 and 9% in 2100. The UN
projects the least amount of growth, reaching 8.9 billion in 2050. IIASA projects the
most, reaching 9.9 billion in the same year, and the USCB projects an intermediate
figure of 9.3 billion. In the longer term, IIASA projects a global population of 10.4
billion in 2100 that has already begun to decline from a peak of 10.6 billion in 2080. In
contrast, the UN projects a somewhat smaller population of 9.5 billion in 2100, but one
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that is still growing slowly (reaching 9.7 billion in 2150, the end of the projection
period).
Figure 6: Global population projections.  High, central, and low projections from
the UN and IIASA, and the US Census Bureau projection.  The high and
low scenarios from IIASA are the Slow and Rapid Demographic
Transition scenarios, respectively.
One noticeable difference is that the IIASA projections are significantly higher than the
projections of either the UN or the USCB, particularly in the short-term. For example,
the IIASA Central scenario is indistinguishable from the UN High scenario until after
2030, while the UN medium scenario closely tracks the IIASA Rapid Transition
scenario until 2040 or so. Most of this difference is likely due to the higher levels of
fertility in developing regions in the base period used in the IIASA projections, which
were produced several years before the significant downward revisions in these data
were made by the UN.
In the long term, the UN High and Low scenarios span a somewhat wider range
than the IIASA scenarios. For example, the UN projects a global population of 5 to 16
billion by 2100, based on its Low and High scenarios, while IIASA projects a range of
6.5 to 15 billion based on its Rapid and Slow Demographic Transition scenarios.
Because these scenarios assume that fertility and mortality are correlated, the range of
future population sizes is diminished since low fertility is offset somewhat by low
mortality, and high fertility by high mortality. If a central mortality scenario is used
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6.1.1 Regional and national comparison
Projections of global population growth tend to  differ less across institutions than
projections for smaller regions, since disagreements tend to cancel when regional
projections are aggregated to global totals. Figure 7 compares the UN medium scenario
to the US Census Bureau projection for the world, major regions, and for the ten largest
countries. The largest percentage differences between the two projections tend to be for
individual countries. For example, the USCB projects a significantly smaller population
for Pakistan than does the UN - nearly 30% smaller than the UN projection by 2050.
This is partly due to an 8% smaller assumed population in 1995, which is then
compounded by a lower assumed future fertility path (see Figure 2) and a lower life
expectancy path (see Figure 4). The USCB also projects significantly smaller
population of Brazil, again due to lower assumed future fertility and life expectancy.
Whereas the USCB tends to project smaller populations than the UN for these
countries, in some instances their projections are higher than the UN’s. For Indonesia,
the USCB projects a population that approaches 10% larger than the UN projection by
2025. This is due in part to a larger assumed initial population in 1995 and in part to a
higher assumed fertility over the first few decades of the projection, as well as to higher
assumed life expectancy. The USCB projection for the United States is more than 10%
larger than the UN projection in 2050 due mainly to a higher assumed fertility.
Figure 7: Percent difference in population size between the USCB projection and
the UN medium variant for the ten largest countries (dashed lines) and
the world and selected major regions (solid lines), 1995-2050.  Values
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In contrast, differences between projected sizes of regions, which aggregate many
countries together, tend to be smaller. For example, projections of population for the
world, Europe, Asia, and  Oceania differ by only a few percent over the projection
period. Differences in Africa are larger, approaching 5% around 2025, and there is a
growing difference in the projected population of Latin America (more than 5% by
2050).
In some cases, agreement in projections of population size can mask large
differences in underlying assumptions with offsetting effects. For example, projections
of population growth in Nigeria differ very little between institutions. However, as
demonstrated in Figures 2 and 4, this masks large offsetting disagreements in projected
fertility and mortality.
6.1.2 Momentum
Projections across institutions or across different scenarios from the same institution
differ less in the short term than in the long term because of shared baseline data and
the phenomenon of population momentum. Momentum refers to the growth that is
built-in to the young age structure of growing populations: in a young population, even
if fertility falls sharply, the numbers of mothers will continue to increase for a
generation as the larger young cohorts age into their reproductive years (Keyfitz 1971).
As a result, growing populations will continue to grow for some time even if fertility is
instantly reduced to replacement level.
 Some low fertility industrialized countries are
subject to negative population momentum. Their populations have aged enough to
result in relatively small cohorts under age 30, and therefore even if fertility were to rise
instantly to replacement level, population size would decline for some time.
Figure 8 illustrates the phenomenon of momentum at the global level. In the UN
instant replacement level scenario, in which each cohort exactly replaces  itself,
population grows from 5.7 billion in 1995 to 7.4 billion in 2025 due to momentum
alone. Momentum decreases uncertainty in population size in the short term because the
next generation of reproductive-aged women has already been born. Thus differences
between projections in the number of births over the short term arise primarily from
differences in projected fertility rates, and not from projected numbers of women of
childbearing age. For example, as shown in the figure, the UN Low and High scenarios
project a global population of 7.3 to 8.4 billion in 2025. This range of just over 1 billion
is far smaller than the range of 11 billion the scenarios produce in 2100, after the effects
of momentum have faded.
Bongaarts and Bulatao (1999) offer a simple means of calculating the momentum
inherent in currently high-fertility populations, and of projecting long-term populationDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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size without resorting to the cohort-component method, assuming fertility stabilizes at
replacement level. While useful for communicating a fundamental feature of population
dynamics, the momentum concept is less useful to projecting future population size if
eventual fertility is not at replacement level, or if current fertility is below replacement
level.
Figure 8: Population momentum.  The High, Medium and Low scenarios compared
to the instant replacement level scenario from the UN Long-Range
Projections.
6.1.3 Absolute vs. relative growth
Despite the significant momentum in the current global population, growth over the
next 50 years is still surprisingly uncertain. Using the UN 1998 Revision as an example,
Figure 9 shows the implications of current global population projections for growth
rates and absolute additions to the population, along with the historical trends in these
figures since 1950. The global population growth rate, which peaked in the late 1960s at
above 2 percent per year, is expected to fall steadily from its current level of just under
1.5 %/yr to 0.4 %/yr by 2050 in the central scenario. The high and low scenarios show
that the plausible range for these figures is -0.2 to +0.9 %/yr in 2050. While this
represents a substantial range, in all cases the rate of growth is expected to decline, and
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Figure 9: Annual absolute and relative population growth according to UN
estimates and projections for low, medium and high scenarios.
The absolute growth in population peaked in the late 1980s at about 86 million per year,
and in the central scenario will remain above 60 million per year until 2020 and will
decline more steeply thereafter. The projected drop-off in absolute growth is not as
great as the drop-off in percent growth since population size is growing over this
period. The projected range of population increments is very large: in the high scenario,
annual growth increases to 95 million per year before beginning a slow decline, while
in the low scenario it falls off steeply to zero in the 2030s. Thus, the UN 1998
projections cannot say with confidence whether global population will be declining or
growing by more than 90 million per year 50 years in the future.
6.1.4 Recent UN revisions
Figure 10 shows the progressively slower population growth projected by the 1994,
1996, and 1998 Revisions from the UN. Projected population in 2050 dropped from
about 10 billion in 1994 to less than 9 billion in 1998, a dramatic drop over a short
period of time that received wide media attention. Nearly all of this change stemmed
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projected fertility in LDCs. This was due first to a lower estimate of current fertility
levels in  LDCs, and then to a further downward revision of projected fertility (see
section 5.2 on projecting future fertility).
Figure 10: Projected global and LDC population according to the UN 1994, 1996,
and 1998 Revisions.
6.2 Age structure
Momentous changes in age structure are clearly in store. Figure 11 shows that while in
1995 the global population below age 15 was about three times the size of the
population above age 60, the proportion aged 60+ is projected to swell in all scenarios
while the proportion below age 15 shrinks. For example, based on the UN Medium and
IIASA Central scenarios, the proportion aged 60+ is likely to surpass the proportion
below age 15 by the middle of the 21
st century (2045 to 2060). The range of uncertainty
in the relative sizes of these age groups is high, however. Based the high and low
scenarios from these institutions, the 60+ age group could overtake the below-15 age
group as early as 2030 or as late as well beyond 2100. This reflects the uncertainty in
the rates of change in each of these age groups considered separately. While in all cases
the proportion of the population below 15 is expected to fall, it could reach anywhere
from 10 to 22% of the total population in 2100. Similarly, while the proportion aged
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Figure 11: UN, IIASA and USCB global population projections by age groups as
proportions of total population.  Results of low, medium, and high
projections are indicated by dotted, solid, and dashed lines, respectively.
The IIASA scenarios project a significantly wider range of uncertainty in future age
structure because the correlation assumed between fertility and mortality in these
scenarios reinforces aging trends, even while it narrows the range of future population
size.
The proportion of the population aged 15-59 is projected to be somewhat more
stable across scenarios and across time. Figure 11 shows that this proportion is just
under 60% in 1995 and falls to 47 - 59% in all IIASA scenarios by 2100, and 50-55% in
the UN scenarios in the same year.
6.3 Distribution
6.3.1 Urbanization
Currently, the only institution that produces projections of urban and rural population
growth at the global scale is the UN, which projects the proportion of total population
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single scenario to 2030 (UN 1998c, 2000b; Note 15). According to this scenario, the
world is expected to continue a historical trend of increasing urbanization. In 2000,
47% of the global population is estimated to reside in urban areas, and the urban
population was growing three times faster than the population as a whole. Urban
dwellers are expected to outnumber the rural population beginning in 2008, and by
2030 to make up 60% of the total population. In  MDCs, the urban population is
projected to rise from about 76% of total population in 2000 to 84% by 2030. In LDCs,
the urban proportion rises more steeply from 40% currently to 56% in 2030, narrowing
the gap in urbanization levels between MDCs and LDCs. Nonetheless, the projected
level of urbanization in LDCs in 2030 will be similar to the level reached in MDCs in
the 1950s. There is clearly scope for a continued shift in population from rural areas to
urban centers beyond 2030.
The projected rate of urbanization in the UN scenario implies that nearly all
population growth over the next three decades will occur in urban areas. In fact, rural
populations in several developing country regions are expected to begin to decline
within a few decades.
One difficulty in projecting urban population from historical data is the wide
variety of definitions of "urban" employed by different countries (UN 1998c). Many
countries define urban areas in administrative terms, for example according to the kind
of authority under which an area falls. Often, population size or density of an area is
employed as a key criterion. Additionally, characteristics such as the proportion of labor
force employed in non-agricultural activities or the availability of urban facilities such
as water or sewer systems may be used. The UN does not impose a single definition of
urban across all countries. Rather, while it adjusts data to maximize consistency of
definitions over time within countries, the UN adopts each country's own definition.
The projection methodology is based on extrapolating the rate of change of the
ratio of the urban population of a particular country to its rural population. Historical
data shows that this "urban-rural growth difference (URGD)", so named because the
rate of change of this ratio is equal to the difference between the urban and rural growth
rates, tends to be higher in less urbanized populations and decline as urbanization
proceeds. The UN methodology projects changes in the URGD by first using cross-
sectional data from 1995 to define a global average relationship between the level of
urbanization and the URGD. It then assumes that each country moves from its current
URGD to the world norm for its level of urbanization over the next 20 years, and then
all countries follow the world norm thereafter.
Essentially, the methodology produces an S-shaped projection of the urban
proportion of national populations that approaches complete urbanization more and
more slowly as time passes. These urban fractions are then applied to the independentDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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projections of total population to produce projections of total urban and rural
population.
6.3.2 Regional balance
Figure 12 shows the change in the regional balance of population according to the
medium variant of the UN long-range projection. The share of the global population
made up by currently industrialized countries (defined as the regions of North America,
Oceania, and Europe) declines from about 18% to just over 10%, due mainly to the
decline in the share constituted by Europe. The increase in the share made up by
currently less developed countries is not distributed equally: Africa's share of the total
grows the most over this period from 13% to 24%, while the contribution of China
actually falls from 21% to 14%. These conclusions are qualitatively consistent across
other scenarios, as well as across institutions.
McNicoll (1999) notes that, to date, population size has not translated neatly into
political power in the international system. However, within specific regions, the most
populated places tend to wield disproportionate influence. In addition, he argues that
demographic “weights” (i.e., relative size) will increase in importance at the global
scale, in large part due to claims over natural resources such as the oceans (i.e.,
fisheries) and atmosphere (i.e., greenhouse gases) if these claims are based at least in
part on per capita allocations or access rights.
Figure 12: Percent of total world population by region, 2000-2150, according to the
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6.4 Accuracy of projections
While it is impossible to assess empirically the accuracy of the most recent projections
of future population, the record of past projections can shed some light on what
reasonable expectations regarding uncertainty might be and might also hold lessons for
improving future projections. Yet surprisingly little research has been conducted on this
topic. The recent NRC report (NRC 2000), building on earlier work by Keilman (1998),
assesses several projections made by the UN and the World Bank since the early 1970s.
The report concludes that projections of global population growth made over the past
several decades have generally been too high, as measured against the current estimate
of the population in the year 2000. These overestimates occurred despite that fact that
several earlier projections underestimated the population in the base year of the
projection (Keilman 1998, Note 16). These errors were more than compensated for by
projections of fertility that turned out to be too high, an outcome driven mainly by the
failure to anticipate the speed of the fertility decline in developing countries.
Studies of the accuracy of population projections must wrestle with several
choices. First, although accuracy is defined in general as how close projected variables
came to estimates of actual values, choices must be made about which variables (e.g.,
population size, age structure, vital rates) and measures (e.g., absolute error, relative
error, point estimates or averages over time) are most appropriate to the task. While
global population size is a convenient summary measure, analyses focused on other
variables in specific regions can be more informative regarding the causes of errors. In
addition, care must be taken to distinguish between inaccuracies resulting from errors in
projections of vital rates and those resulting from errors in baseline data. Accuracy
studies rely on current estimates of baseline data as representative of "correct" values,
but this strategy is problematic itself, since these estimates are constantly being revised.
Furthermore, aggregation can complicate analysis since accuracy for a given region
may mask offsetting errors at subregional levels. Finally, an important limitation of
accuracy studies is the short history of projections (about 50 years) compared to the
time horizon of future projections (100-150 years). While a few older long-term
projections exist (Lee 1991), differences in methodology make them of questionable
relevance to contemporary practice.
Projections from the UN and World Bank have tended to become more accurate
over time, as measured by their ability to forecast population in 2000. Projections of the
world population made in the early 1970s were in error by 6-7%, while projections
made in the 1990s were off by less than 1%; at the country level, average absolute
errors declined from about 18% to about 4% over this same period (NRC 2000). Of
course most of this decline is due to the fact that more recent projections simply have
less time to go wrong before 2000. In addition, baseline data has improved over time.
Analyses of errors in country-level projections over equal projection lengths have notDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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yielded clear signs of improvement. For example, projections of population 10 years
into the future have not improved substantially over the past several decades (NRC
2000). Whether the ability to forecast trends in fertility, mortality, and migration has
improved is also unclear. One difficulty in such exercises is completely controlling for
errors in base period data – not only for population size, but for vital rates as well.
Baseline errors in all relevant demographic variables are clearly important
(Keilman 1990), so it is worth noting that uncertainty in the initial conditions of
populations is not explicitly accounted for in global population projections. For
example, the UN uses identical base populations for all its scenarios, and IIASA uses
identical initial conditions for its probabilistic projections. Thus uncertainty in future
global population size is likely larger than their results indicate, and disproportionately
so for regions where the baseline population estimates are in question.
Projections of population size tend to tend to be more uncertain under particular
circumstances (NRC 2000). They are less accurate (1) in developing countries than in
industrialized countries, partly due to limited and less reliable data; (2) in smaller
countries than in larger ones, perhaps due to the greater attention devoted to larger
countries; (3) in younger and older age groups than in middle age groups, since the
effects of incorrect assumptions about fertility and mortality are felt more strongly at
these ages; and (4) at the country level than at regional or global levels, since errors at
the country level partly cancel each other when aggregated, countries are more
susceptible to errors from migration assumptions, and aggregate regions are more
influenced by larger countries, for which projections tend to be more accurate.
Projecting vital rates has proved to be difficult. UN projections of death rates have
consistently been overly pessimistic, and projections of birth rates have generally been
too high, particularly during the 1960s and 70s when developing country fertility fell
faster than expected, but also in North America and Europe (Keilman 1998). There are
however important exceptions to this general rule. Projections made from 1975 to 1985
of birth and death rates in China were too low, and more recently mortality projections
for the former Soviet Union have been too low. In general, fertility has been more
difficult to project than mortality when data of equal quality has been available,
although the paucity of mortality data makes it a significant source of uncertainty
nonetheless.
Figure 13 shows a compilation of projected TFR for the world and several major
areas according to the medium variants of past UN projections, as compared to current
estimates of actual TFR values over the period 1965-2000. It demonstrates that,
averaged over the world (Figure 13a), UN fertility projections have consistently been
too high. This has been true in most regions of the world. For example, projections for
Latin America (Figure 13b) have suffered from inaccurate base period estimates of
fertility, which contributed to  overprojecting future fertility. Projections for EuropeDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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(Figure 13c) have benefited from more accurate base period data, but consistently
anticipated a halt to the decline in fertility, which in actuality continued to proceed well
below replacement level. (Note 17) In a few cases fertility in a major area has been
significantly underestimated, but this has tended to occur primarily for base period
estimates for older projections, as for example in the 1965 and 1970 projections for
China (Figure 13d).
Figure 14 shows a similar compilation for medium variant projections of life
expectancy. Averaged over the world (Figure 14a), the UN has generally been overly
pessimistic about increases in life expectancy. However the experience with different
regions has varied. Projections for Africa (Figure 14b) have consistently been overly
optimistic, missing especially the flattening in life expectancy after 1985. In contrast,
projections for North America (Figure 14c) have generally been too low (although 1985
and 1990 projections equaled or exceeded estimates), failing to foresee the persistent
rise in life expectancy even at already high levels of greater than 70 years. Accurate
base period data has been a problem in many instances. Projections for India
(Figure 14d) in 1975 a nd 1980, for example, underestimated then current life
expectancies by several years, and even recent estimates of base period life expectancy
in Africa (Figure 14b) have turned out to be several years too high.
UN projections of urban population growth in developing countries have also
generally been too high (Brockerhoff 2000). The most recent projections, made in 1996,
foresee an urban population in 2000 that is 10% smaller than projected in 1980 - just 16
years earlier - using an essentially identical method. This difference is not primarily
due to slower than expected growth of population in general, since projections of total
population has been revised by only 2% over the same period, but rather to
overestimating the rate of urbanization itself. The reasons for a slower than expected
growth of urban population in developing countries are not clear, but evidence suggests
that weak expansion of urban industries, population aging, and policies affecting
population distribution may have played a role (Brockerhoff 2000). The inaccuracy of
earlier urban growth projections emphasizes the uncertainty that must be attached to the
recent UN projection of urbanization through 2030.
Finally, it must be kept in mind that although analysis of past errors can provide
insight into the projection process, demographic change is path dependent; thus success
or failure in projecting population under one set of conditions does not necessarily
imply continued success or failure under a different set of conditions in the future. In
addition, as would be expected, errors grow with the duration of the projection. Thus
the performance of past projections over time horizons of a few decades becomes less
and less relevant as the horizon of future projections stretches to 100 years or more.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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Figure 13a: Historical projections of Total Fertility Rate (TFR) by the UN over the
period 1965 -2000 for (a) the world, (b) Latin America, (c) Europe, and
(d) China.  The solid blue line shows the most recent estimates of TFR
through the 1990-95 period and projected TFR for 1995-2000 from the
UN 1998 Revision.  Historical projections are labeled according to their
base period (i.e., "1965" indicates a projection using 1965-70 as the base
period) and specific sources are given in Note 18.
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Figure 13c: Europe total fertility rate
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Figure 14a: Historical projections of life expectancy by the UN over the period 1965-
2000 for (a) the world, (b) Africa, (c) North America, and (d) India.  The
solid blue line shows the most recent estimates of life expectancy through
the 1990-95 period and projected life expectancy for 1995-2000 from the
UN 1998 Revision.  Historical projections are labeled according to their
base period (i.e., "1965" indicates a projection using 1965-70 as the base
period) and specific sources are given in Note 18.
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Figure 14c: North America life expectancy at birth
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Notes
1.   Often, the terms "projection" and "forecast" are used interchangeably. However, in
some cases demographers differentiate between the terms based on the implied
likelihood of the outcome. Projections are defined as the numerical consequences
of an assumed set of future paths for fertility, mortality, and migration with no
claim as to the likelihood of these consequences actually coming to pass. A
forecast, on the other hand, is defined as the most likely projection (IUSSP 1982,
Ahlburg and Land 1992), in the same way that a weather forecast describes the
most likely outcome. Here, we use the term projection but attach no specific
meaning to it. Instead, we specify the interpretations different agencies assign to
their outputs.
2.   Replacement level fertility is the total fertility rate at which, given prevailing
mortality rates and fertility patterns by age group, the childbearing generation
would have just enough children to exactly replace itself. If fertility remains
constant at the replacement level, population size eventually stabilizes (assuming
mortality remains constant and net migration is zero). The Total Fertility Rate
corresponding to current mortality conditions is slightly less then 2.1 in developed
countries, but is as high as 2.6 in Africa and 2.4 in South Asia where mortality is
higher (NRC 2000).
3.   For these years, the World Bank’s methodology is included in several paragraphs
of table notes (World Bank 1984, pp. 281-282) but they do not indicate the source
upon which their information is based nor do they indicate how the various pieces
of information related to one another to estimate future rates.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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4.   Exceptions are the UN, which does not use the cohort-component method for 41
countries or areas whose populations were below 150,000 in 1995, and the US
Census Bureau, which uses an alternative method for 14 small countries or
territories with a combined total 1998 population of about 800,000 people. These
exceptions make up only a small fraction of the global population.
5.   An exception is the US Census Bureau, which uses single year time steps and age
groups.
6.   However, it is possible to project total population using an aggregate method, and
to calculate a consistent age structure after the fact (Lee et al 1995).
7.   The same cannot be done with the UN scenarios because net migration would not
be balanced for the world.
8.   Although family planning programs have been the main intervention to lower
fertility, these programs have often been implemented concomitantly with general
economic development programs, educational programs, and health programs, each
of which may have an indirect effect on changing fertility.
9.   Exceptions are those countries for which data on the completed fertility of the
cohort born in 1962 is available. In these cases, the average of the 1962 cohort
fertility and the target level as described in the text is used.
10.  If fertility in the base period was lower than the ultimate level as determined by
subtracting 0.4 from the ultimate fertility level in the medium variant, the fertility
in the base period was used as the ultimate level.
11.  The high assumptions are 2.3 in North America and Eastern Europe, and 2.1 in
Western Europe and Japan/Australia. The assumptions are slightly higher for North
America because of its different ethnic composition.
12.  Brazil and Thailand were included not because they had met the seroprevalence
cut-off, but rather because the country-specific modeling work had already been
completed (USCB 1999) and presumably indicated that adjustments for AIDS
mortality were warranted.
13.  For Nigeria, the UN assumes 3.4% adult HIV prevalence in 1997 (using the age
distribution for 1995 from the UN 1998 Revision this translates to total country
prevalence of 1.9%), and projects a peak in adult prevalence in about 2010 of 10%
(=6.0% total country prevalence; UN 1999d). USCB assumes 2.2% total country
prevalence in 1995, climbing to a peak of 15% in 2010 (USCB 1999) - two and a
half times the level projected by the UN. For Brazil, the USCB estimates total
country prevalence in 1995 at 0.7%, whereas the UN assumptions are lower; 0.5%Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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adult HIV prevalence in 1997, and projecting a peak of just over 1.2% in 2005
(=0.9% total country prevalence). The two institutions model the spread of HIV
and the development of AIDS using different tools. The USCB uses the iwgAIDS
model developed under sponsorship of the US State Dept (Stanley et al 1991). The
UN uses EPIMODEL, developed by the WHO (Chin and  Lwanga 1991). The
USCB refers to "country specific modeling" that was done for Brazil (and
Thailand). The description of this modeling implies that the iwgAIDS model was
used in Brazil as in other countries, although the substantial homosexual and IV
drug-user component of the epidemic was unique relative to African nations.
14.  According to the UNHCR, there were about 13 million refugees in 1995, and an
additional 13 million "persons of concern to the UNHCR," a group which includes
people forced from their homes or communities but still residing in their own
countries. Since Myers includes displaced persons who have not crossed
international borders in his definition of "environmental refugees", the total figure
- 26 million - is the most relevant for comparison.
15.  The UN revised their earlier urbanization projections in 1999, based on the 1998
Revisions.
16.  Errors in baseline data were especially important for elderly age groups before
1980. Since then errors in baseline population size data have been <1% at all ages
(Keilman 1998).
17.  The figure for Europe has not been corrected for changing regional definition over
time; results are therefore preliminary.
18.   Notes to Figures 13 and 14:
The following sources were used for each projection.  This list is identical to the
one used by Keilman (1998), with the exception of the 1994 Revision.  Note that
neither projections of TFR nor life expectancy could be extended through 1995-
2000 for China, India, and the United States in the 1965 projection.
Projection* UN Publication
1965 (1973) World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1968. Population
Studies, No. 53
1970 (1977) World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1973. Population
Studies, No. 60
1975 I (1980) Selected Demographic Indicators by Country, 1950-2000:
Demographic estimates and projections as assessed in 1978
1975 II (1981) World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1980. Population
Studies, No. 78Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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1980 I (1985) World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed
in 1982. Population Studies, No. 86
1980 II (1986) World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed
in 1984. Population Studies, No. 98
1985I (1989b) World Population Prospects: 1988. Population Studies, No. 106
1985 II (1991b) World Population Prospects, 1990. Population Studies, No. 120
1990 (1995) World Population Prospects: The 1994 Revision, No. 145
Estimate (1999) World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision, Volume I,
Comprehensive Tables.
* Projections are labelled according to the last year for which population was estimated rather than projected.
For three of the projections, the United Nations publishes data for gross
reproduction rate (GRR)
* instead of TFR.  In these instances, GRR was




1965 GRR * 1.06
1970 GRR * 1.06
1980I GRR * 1.05
For four of the projections, the United Nations publishes data for sub-regions
of Asia instead of Asia as a whole.  Data for as Asia was therefore aggregated
as follows:
Projection Asia Aggregation
1965 (East Asia + South Asia)/2
1970 (East Asia + South Asia)/2
1975I (East Asia + South Asia)/2
1975II (East Asia + South Asia)/2
                                                          
*  Gross Reproduction Rate: Average number of daughters born per woman in a group of women passing
through the reproductive span if mortality were zero and they experienced the given age-specific
fertility rates at each age
￿  Sex Ratio at Birth: the number of males per 100 females; normally around 105Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 8
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